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Abstract
This thesis contains two studies that examine the interaction between corporate gov-
ernance and firm performance.
In the first study, I examine whether board friendliness reduces crash risk. I
measure friendliness by the Political Homophily Index (PHI), which captures the
similarity of political orientations of managers and directors. We find that firms’
crash risk decreases in political homophily. The results are robust when we instru-
ment the change in PHI by the change in local political homogeneity. Our results
suggest that better alignment in political orientations facilitates information sharing,
including information on bad outcomes in a timely manner. The effect is more pro-
nounced when firms have stronger corporate governance mechanisms and directors
have a stronger incentive to acquire information.
In the second study, I examine how the use of relative performance evaluation
(RPE) affects industry competition. Using data from the U.S. airline industry, we
estimate a dynamic game of competition with heterogeneous firms in an oligopolis-
tic market with the presence of RPE contracts. As is standard, RPE makes CEO
compensation less sensitive to market conditions. Therefore, the CEO’s propen-
sity to operate in a given market is determined by a trade-off that arises between
the reduction in compensation based on market conditions and the gain from being
compared to competing agents. The estimation results show that the use of RPE
decreases a firm’s tendency to be active under bad market conditions by 10.1%.
Conversely, the tendency to be active rises in good market conditions by 12.4%.




Corporate governance has been believed to be critical to ensure that activities and
policies of management are in line with shareholders’ interests. However, the prac-
tice of corporate governance is complicated. In this thesis, I study two important
aspects of corporate governance and examine their effect on firm performance: the
characteristic of independent directors and the contracting of CEO compensation.
As pointed out in Adams and Ferreira (2007), there is a trade-off between the
monitoring role and the advisory role played by independent directors. The inde-
pendent directors have the responsibility to discipline the CEO from not behaving in
the best of shareholders’ interest. However, tougher in monitoring makes indepen-
dent directors harder to acquire firm-specific information from the CEO, especially
in bad situations. Therefore, in theory, a friendly board may benefit the firm by
facilitating information sharing between the CEO and directors.
In Chapter 2, I empirically examine the benefit of friendly boards. Particu-
larly, we construct measures of individual political orientation using their donations
to candidates during Federal Election cycles. The similarity between individual
political orientation can serve as an ideal instrument for the friendliness between
CEO and independent directors: the more similar political orientation is, the more
friendly are the independent directors towards to CEO. Using the measure of po-
litical similarity, we then develop and test hypotheses on the benefit of a friendly
board. Firstly, we find that higher political similarity between the CEO and inde-
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pendent directors significantly associates with lower crash risk in firm stock prices.
The effect is stronger for firms with stronger corporate governance mechanisms.
Secondly, we find evidence that the insider trading from independent directors is
more informative when they share similar political orientation with the CEO. In ad-
dition, our results are robust when we instrument the change in political similarity
by the change in local political homogeneity. Our findings provide strong support
to the argument that the friendly board may benefit the firm.
Another practice to align the CEO’s behavior with shareholders’ interest is to set
up an incentive compatible compensation contract. Especially, people believe that
the best practice should only award CEO based on his/her attribution. That is why
the Relative Performance Evaluation (RPE) is widely regarded in the literature on
optimal contracts as an efficient tool to incentivize CEO effort. However, the evi-
dence of RPE in practice is largely mixed. The reason is that the use of RPE greatly
affects the strategic interaction within the industry. Therefore, it is questionable
both theoretically and empirically that to what extend the use of RPE is optimal.
In Chapter 3, we examine how the use of RPE affects industry competition. We
develop a parsimonious dynamic game of competition with heterogeneous firms
in an oligopoly market where CEOs make entry-exit decisions to maximize their
expected discounted inter-temporal utilities, taking as given their expectations about
competitor actions. In this setting, we find that the use of RPE has an asymmetric
effect on competition depending on market conditions. When the market condition
is good, the use of RPE encourages CEO to take more competition. However, if the
market condition is bad, the use of RPE decreases the probability of a firm being
active in a certain market.
Furthermore, we use data from the US airline industry to estimate the model.
The information on quantities, prices, and route entry-exit decisions between the 50
largest U.S. metropolitan statistical areas provides an ideal set-up of an oligopoly
industry. The estimated model is able to match key features of the market structure
and dynamics. Our estimation results confirm the existence of Relative Performance
Evaluation. In addition, the use of RPE depends also on the firm’s comparative
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advantage relative to its peers, suggested from the estimated operating cost.
Lastly, Chapter 4 concludes the thesis and summarizes my findings.
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Chapter 2
The Effect of Politically Alignment
Between the CEO and the Board on
Firm’s Crash Risk
2.1 Introduction
The pace of change has accelerated dramatically in the business world due to the
rapid emergence of technologies, presenting boards with an ever more challeng-
ing environment. At the same time, boards face growing pressure from a variety of
stakeholders, ranging from institutional investors to proxy advisory firms and share-
holder activists. As stated in the speech by the former SEC Commissioner, Luis A.
Aguilar, at the 12th Annual Boardroom Summit and Peer Exchange in 2015, their
fiduciary responsibility requires boards to ensure that they possess necessary skills
and judgment, to foresee opportunities and problems that lie ahead, and to apply
their expertise to help navigate their firms.1
However, meeting this high standard is not an easy task, especially when there
is a rising trend in demand for independence. To effectively discipline, independent




to protect shareholders’ interests. By selection, such directors are likely to have
inferior information to corporate insiders and may lack of knowledge when their
firms face negative shocks.2 Therefore, it is increasingly critical for the outside
directors to acquire information for them to be competent stewards.
In this chapter, we study whether board friendliness lowers the firm’s crash risk
by encouraging managers to share private information with independent directors.
Since many board members have full-time jobs in other corporations, they rely on
the chief executive and the company’s management to provide them with relevant
firm-specific information (Adams and Ferreira (2007)). The better the information
the CEO provides, the better is the board’s advice. Therefore, the “friendliness”
should be an important characteristic for the board to incentivize the CEO to share
their private information. However, the concept of friendliness has not been well
defined in the literature and it may contain multi-dimensional interpretation. It is
very challenging to find a proper measure for friendliness in the setting of CEO-
board relationship.
Ideally, we need a measure of friendliness which satisfies three criteria. First, the
measure can map the multi-dimensional concept of friendliness into a linear space
so that we can easily use the measure to investigate the impact of friendliness on
firm’s performance. Second, this measure should at its best to capture the friend-
liness but not the friendship, since the latter characteristic apparently hurts board
independence. Last but not least, the measure should be regarded to be correlated
with people’s intentions for collaboration. A such measure should be believed to be
connected with better communication and information sharing, which is the channel
that we propose to benefit the value of the firm.
In particular, we examine “friendliness” in terms of political similarity. Our hy-
pothesis is that similarity in the political orientation of the CEO and board helps
facilitate information sharing and reduces crash risk. The measure of “friendliness”
2For example, on February 2, 2018, the Federal Reserve issued an enforcement action
against Wells Fargo, which, among other things, publicly censured directors for the failures
of risk oversight and “lack of inquiry and lack of demand for additional information”. See
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/files/enf20180202a2.pdf.
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in terms of political similarity certainly satisfies the first criterion, since we can eas-
ily map the political orientation into a linear space in which Republic-leaning posits
on the one end and Democratic-leaning posits on the other end. This measure also
satisfies the second criterion, since sharing similar political leaning does not nec-
essarily mean that they also share physical friendship in real life. In addition, we
control for social relationships in our tests to further isolate the effect of personal
connection. For the third criterion, in psychology, sociology, and political science
literature, it is well documented that sharing similar political orientation could en-
hance cooperation. For example, Huber and Malhotra (2017) document that people
evaluate potential dating partners more favorably and are more likely to reach out
to them when they have similar political characteristics. In Banda, Carsey and Sev-
erenchuk (2019), authors find that partisans evaluate objects linked to the opposing
party less favorably than otherwise identical nonpartisan objects. In the broader
context, political ideology is one critical component to form social identification,
and there is widely established research documented the positive effect of in-group
social identification on promoting cooperation in social dilemmas (De Cremer and
Van Vugt (1999)). Individuals favor the in-group to which they belong which they
define against a relevant out-group, and political leaning is one of the key elements
to form such social identity (Greene (2002)).
Moreover, political leaning may be directly linking to the preference of corpo-
rate decisions. As shown in Hutton, Jiang and Kumar (2014), political preferences
of managers influence corporate policies.3 When managers and boards have similar
political orientation, they will cooperate more and jointly formulate policies that
are in conformity with their common political priors. This suggests more infor-
mation sharing, including information on bad outcomes in a timely manner. Also,
“friendly” boards are more willing to share the blame for bad outcomes since poli-
cies are set jointly. In this case, a friendly board reduces the costs of the CEO for
sharing information. So the investors could process the information gradually and
it is less likely to have an unexpected negative shock for the firm. Thus, we should
3Specifically, they find that Republican managers who are likely to have conservative personal
ideologies adopt and maintain more conservative corporate policies.
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also expect that the crash risks of the firm with a friendly board is lower.
Using the political leaning of the CEO and that of the directors, we can mea-
sure the similarity of the political orientation of the CEO and the board. We define
it as the Political Homophily Index (PHI). For each individual (a CEO or a direc-
tor), we capture her(his) political leaning using a Republican Index constructed with
her(his) contributions made to Republican and Democratic candidates and commit-
tees. The underlying assumption is that political contributions made by individuals
can largely be viewed as consumptions of political good (Gordon, Hafer and Landa
(2015)) rather than political investments, and can largely reflect an individual’s po-
litical leaning (Lee, Lee and Nagarajan (2014)). Therefore, the relative (dollar)
amounts of political donations made to the two parties could capture which di-
rection the person’s political ideology tilts towards.4 We then take the average of
political orientations of all independent directors for a given firm-year and construct
the PHI as the similarity between the Republican Index of the CEO and that of the
independent directors.5
To test the prediction that political similarity between the CEO and board re-
duces crash risk, we regress two measures of crash risk on our measure of political
alignment, PHI. We find that both the Negative Coefficient of Skewness (NCSKEW)
and down-to-up volatility of the firm (DUVOL) are negatively associated with the
political alignment between the CEO and the board. The results are obtained af-
ter controlling for firm fixed effects, year fixed effects, and factors that also affect
the negative skewness of the stock returns (including Board Size, 1-year lagged
ROA Investment, R&D, log(Assets), Market Leverage, and CEO-Director Connec-
tion Strength). The effect is also economically significant. For one standard devia-
tion increase in political alignment, the firm’s negative skewness of stock returns is
4The Republican Index is the difference between the dollar amounts of political donations made
by individual i in year t to the Republican and that to the Democratic candidates and committees
in the federal elections, scaled by the total amount to both parties. A positive (negative) value of
Rep indicates that the individual’s political orientation is more conservative (liberal). We discuss the
measures in detail in Section 2.2.2.
5PHI takes a value between [0, 1], where a value of one (zero) indicates that the independent
directors share most (least) similar political orientation with the CEO, and are more (less) friendly
to the CEO.
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reduced by 0.002, whereas the sample mean of NCSKEW is only around 0.001. Our
results are robust if we further control for the cases when both CEO and independent
directors make 0 political contribution.
Important to note that, the composition of the board is not exogenous. While
we control for firm fixed effects, year fixed effects, firm characteristics, and con-
nections between the CEO and board, certain (unobserved time-varying) factors or
shareholder preferences may drive both the political alignment and the crash risk of
the firm. In this case, we would obtain a correlation between PHI and the crash risk
even when PHI does not affect the crash risk. To mitigate the endogeneity problem,
we construct an instrumental variable for the change in firm PHI and perform a
two-stage least squares estimation to verify our results.
We instrument the change in firm PHI by the change in local political homo-
geneity (Local PHI). Since independent directors are likely to be selected from the
local business community (Knyazeva, Knyazeva and Masulis (2013)), we expect
the political leaning of the the local population to affect the expression of political
leaning of independent directors. We measure the local political homogeneity (Lo-
cal PHI) by the absolute difference between the votes received by the two major
parties in a federal election cycle and regress the change of PHI on the change of
Local PHI for the first stage. We allow the effect to differ between “Safe States” and
“Swing States”,6 since higher discrepancy in political ideology are likely to follow
unexpected electoral outcomes, which can be affected differently by the change in
Local PHI in safe states and swing states.7 We also include lagged PHI to control
for the mechanical reversal of PHI since it is bounded between [0, 1]. We include
6Safe states are defined as states in which Local PHI is above the median and swing states are
defined as states with a Local PHI below the median.
7Specifically, a decrease in ∆Local PHI predicts a decrease in firm’s ∆PHI in safe states because
a decrease in Local PHI in safe states implies a less safe position for the dominating party and higher
uncertainty in the forthcoming election (Lindbeck and Weibull (1987), Duffy and Tavits (2008)).
In this situation, voters have a higher tendency to participate as the prior belief that their votes
are pivotal is increased, leading to less predictable electoral outcomes and greater discrepancy in
political ideology among people. For swing states, however, unexpected electoral outcomes are
more likely to occur when Local PHI increases (i.e., one party gains a more dominating position).
Thus, an increase in ∆Local PHI leads to higher voter participation and a decrease in firm’s ∆PHI in
swing states.
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the same set of control variables as in the baseline regressions.
The results from our first-stage regression are consistent with predictions. An in-
crease in ∆Local PHI (indicating higher uncertainty in electoral outcomes in swing
states and lower uncertainty in safe states) leads to a decrease in firms’ ∆PHI in
swing states, and an increase in firms’ ∆PHI in safe states, which is consistent with
studies in political science. So the change in the local political environment does
significantly affect the firm-level political similarity. Moreover, although it is pos-
sible that election outcomes affect the local economy since different parties have
different preference over inflation and unemployment rate (see Garfinkel and Re-
view (1994)), it can not explain why the effect of Republican (Democratic) gaining
votes on firm crash risk is asymmetric in different states. Therefore, it is less likely
that the change in local political homophily, ∆Local PHI, directly correlates with
the change in crash risk and have an opposite effect in safe and swing states. Based
on these arguments, we believe that our instrument variable satisfies the exclusion
conditions. After conducting the two-stage least squares estimation, we obtain very
consistent results to our baseline model.
Overall, we find very consistent results that crash risk is reduced when the CEO
and independent directors are better aligned in their political orientations. When
independent directors are more friendly towards the CEO, the CEO would be less
hesitant to reveal negative information, leading to lower negative skewness in stock
returns. If, however, the CEO withholds information from the board, when piles
up, negative information is eventually going to be reflected in the stock prices. In
contrast, having prior (social) connections with the board may be mainly associated
with less monitoring of the manager and cannot prevent bad outcomes from hap-
pening. In line with this prediction, we find that connections between the CEO and
the directors do not help reduce crash risk.
We also empirically examine whether better alignment in political orientation
is associated with higher firm value. Political alignment, if impeding board inde-
pendence, would hurt firm value (Lee, Lee and Nagarajan (2014)). However, if the
lower crash risk can be priced, then we would expect board friendliness to be associ-
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ated with higher firm value. To answer this question, we run our baseline regression
with Q as the dependent variable. While the coefficients for PHI is significantly
negative, the coefficient becomes significantly positive when we additionally con-
trol for the case that PHI equals to one because of the 0 political contributions. The
coefficient of Q is also insignificant under the IV 2SLS regression. So the evidence
is largely mixed and it is possible that the negative effect of PHI on firm value is
due to the cases when both CEO and independent directors make 0 political contri-
bution.
A natural question that appears is how the effect of political alignment on crash
risk and firm value interacts with corporate governance mechanisms. On the one
hand, directors receive heavier pressure from shareholders under stronger gover-
nance and may have a higher incentive to acquire information from the CEO. On
the other hand, stronger corporate governance structures may deter the CEO’s will-
ingness to share information with the board. Therefore, it is not emphex ante clear
whether we see a stronger effect under stronger or weaker corporate governance
structures. We split the firms into subsamples based on three dimensions: whether
a staggered board is adopted or not, whether the firm adopts both a staggered board
and poison pill, and whether the percentage of institutional ownership is high. The
staggered board is commonly viewed as a weak corporate governance structure.
Faleye (2007) and Bebchuk and Cohen (2005) find that classified boards are asso-
ciated with less director effectiveness and more management entrenchment. Faleye
(2007) find that management is entrenched the most when combining staggered
board and poison pill since blending the two provisions ensures that a firm can only
be the consent of its directors. Cremers, Litov and Sepe (2017), however, argue that
staggered boards enhance the incentive of directors to build a stable relationship
with executives. We find that the effect of political alignment on crash risk is more
pronounced for firms without a staggered board. The magnitude of the effect is dou-
bled to what we obtained from the whole sample. When the board is staggered (and
when the firm adopts both a staggered board and poison pill), the coefficient is not
statistically significant and the magnitude is much smaller. Similarly, institutional
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investors have been argued to be one of the most important party who undertake
monitoring over executives and also directors. We find that the negative associa-
tion between PHI and crash risks only presents for firms with higher than average
institutional ownership. Therefore, these findings suggest that a friendly board can
only benefit the firm when the governance structure is strong so that directors have
a stronger incentive to acquire information.
Finally, we examine the returns of insider tradings by the CEO and the indepen-
dent directors to further test if political alignment ease information sharing between
the CEO and the independent directors. Open market tradings made by the CEO
and the independent directors are believed to be informative. Ravina and Sapienza
(2010) find that both executives and independent directors earn positive substantial
abnormal returns when they purchase their company stock. Moreover, executives
on average earn more than independent directors when they make open market pur-
chases, indicating that there is a gap between the information held by the CEO and
the independent directors. Using data from the TFN Insider Filing, we empirically
test if a higher political alignment between the CEO and the independent directors is
associated with a smaller gap between the trading returns of open market purchases
made by CEO and independent directors. We find that mimicking the CEO’s long
position yields a 7.5% market-adjusted return in 60 days and independent directors
earn less abnormal returns comparing to CEOs. The coefficients of PHI are not
statistically significant, indicating that having a friendly board does not widen the
information gap between insiders and the market. Finally, the triple interaction of
PHI with Trade Size and ID has a positive coefficient for the 60, 90, and 180 trading
days horizon and is statistically significant, which confirms that political alignment
between the CEO and the independent directors does increase the quantity of in-
formation acquired by independent directors. This is consistent with the conjecture
that a friendly board is more desired when directors have a stronger incentive to
acquire information from the CEO.
This chapter relates to the literature on the friendly board. It has been much
debated in the previous research that to what extend board independence benefits
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shareholders’ value.8 Adams and Ferreira (2007) hypothesize that the CEO faces
a trade-off when s/he decides whether to disclose information with the board or
not. If the CEO shares information to the board, s/he is able to gain better advice.
However, sharing private information imposes costs to the CEO as a more informed
board would monitor the CEO more intensively. Our results support the view that
sharing common ideology between the CEO and independent directors facilitates
information sharing and lower the risk of catastrophe. An important takeaway of
our results is that board friendliness in itself does not imply weak governance and
less board independence. On the contrary, when combines with strong shareholder
protections and less management entrenchment, the friendly board can facilitate in-
formation sharing and reduces crash risk. Moreover, for firms with stronger gover-
nance, the effect of PHI on Q is positive and significant. This distinction sets board
friendliness apart from board dependence measures. To this end, this chapter pro-
vides guidance on how information sharing can be enhanced without compromise
the directors’ independence.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Sections 2.2 describes the sam-
ple and variable constructions. Section 2.3 develops hypotheses and shows our
main empirical findings. Section 2.4 presents additional results on insider tradings.
Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Data Sources and Variable Construction
2.2.1 Individual Contributions
We collect individual political contribution records from the Federal Election Com-
mission (FEC). In each federal election cycle, contributions made by individuals
must be reported to FEC if exceeding the amount of $200. Information contained
in the reporting file includes the donor’s name, employer, occupation, state, city,
and zip code, which can be used to identify the donors. The original dataset con-
8See Byrd and Hickman (1992), Cotter and Shivdasani (1997), Aggarwal et al. (2009), among
others.
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tains 22,074,387 contributions from individuals during the period between 1980
and 2012. Recipients who accept individual contributions can be classified into five
categories: (i) candidate, or candidate committee, (ii) political action committee
(PACs), (iii) state, district & local party committee, (iv) national party committee,
and (v) additional national party committee accounts.9 Using the committee link-
age file provided by FEC, we assign a political leaning of Republican, Democratic,
or other to each receiver. We exclude the contributions to PACs which we may not
able to label with political leaning, such as those connected with corporations, labor
unions, etc. Furthermore, for PACs connected with ideology groups with missing
partisan information in FEC, we obtain the political leaning of such PACs from the
Center for Responsive Politics.
We obtain the information on firm executives is from Compustat’s Execucomp
database. The initial dataset contains 6,951 unique CEOs working for 3,397 firms
during the period 1992-2013. The data of directors are obtained from two sources.
The primary source is the July 2010 data dump provided by BoardEx,10 including
6,322 unique firms for the period 2000 to 2009 with 74,533 unique directors. We
further complement the directors’ data from the second data source RiskMetrics
(through ISS Governance Services, and the database is maintained by IRRC be-
fore 2005), adding 449 more firms that are not covered by BoardEx for the period
2000 to 2009. We then merge the data from Execucomp with that from BoardEx
and RiskMetrics, and keep those firms which have information on both CEO and
independent directors. Our sample contains 2,688 firms for the period from 2000 to
2009.
Next, we use individual names and employment history records to match the
individual contribution data with the sample of CEO and directors. Since the names
9Individual contributions to each receiver are subject to different limits. For example, in the
election cycle 2003-2004, an individual may contribute to each candidate or candidate committee
not more than $2000 per election and national party committee not more than $25,000 per calendar
year. To state, district & local party committee, this number decreases to $10,000 per calendar year.
However, Independent-expenditure-only political committees, often referred to as “super PACs”,
may accept unlimited contributions, from corporations and labor organizations after 2010.
10After 2010, the full dump of BoardEx is no longer allowed, and the names of the director/officer
are not identifiable within the database
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and employment information are self-reported to the FEC, the quality of the data
is not flawless. For example, people may report abbreviated names instead of full
names. They may also report a different employer than the one recorded in BoardEx
or RiskMetrics since there is no strict reporting standard required by FEC. There-
fore, we first re-code all the abbreviations reported in the FEC individual contribu-
tion data to be their full name equivalents. Then we match the individual contribu-
tion data to the CEO and directors sample using only first names and last names.
For the linked sample, we calculate the Jaro-Winkler distance score between the
employer’s name in the individual contribution data and individual’s name in the
CEO and directors sample. The Jaro-Winkler distance score measures the similar-
ity of two strings and varies from 0 to 1, whereas the value of 0 means two strings
are very different, and 1 means two strings are exactly the same. For the individuals
who have multiple employment positions, we calculate all the pairwise scores and
keep the highest one. We keep the matched pairs with Jaro-Winkler score higher
than 0.8 and drop the matching pairs with a Jaro-Winkler score lower than 0.6. All
matching pairs with a Jaro-Winkler score between 0.6 and 0.8 are carefully manu-
ally examined in order to keep the correct match. In the final sample, we are able
to identify 59, 288 contribution records from 2, 711 CEOs and 49, 982 contribution
records from 3, 809 independent directors.
2.2.2 Political Variables
We measure the political leaning of individuals using the political leaning of the
recipients to whom they made contributions. The underlying assumption is that po-
litical contributions made by individuals can largely be viewed as consumptions of
political good (Gordon, Hafer and Landa (2015)), rather than political investments.
Similar to Lee, Lee and Nagarajan (2014), we construct a Republican Index (Rep)







where Rit (Dit) denotes the total dollar amounts of political donations made by
individual i in year t to the Republican (Democratic) candidates and committees in
the federal elections. By definition, the political orientation index Repit takes value
in the range of [−1, 1]. If an individual only contributes to Republican (Demo-
cratic) candidates or committees, the corresponding Rep would take the value 1
(−1). Therefore, the Rep index helps us map the individual political ideology into
a continuous liberal-conservative spectrum, whereas a positive (negative) value of
Rep indicates that the individual’s political orientation is more conservative (lib-
eral).
We do not consider the total amount of political contribution made by individuals
in our Rep index. It is common to think that total political contribution may reflect
the intensity of political involvement, which could potentially bias our measure of
individual political orientation. There are two reasons that we only consider the
simple fraction of contributions to the Republicans in our Rep index. First, the
individual contribution limit (around 5, 000$) is very low compare to the income of
the managers of the firms. The individual political contribution made by such people
is usually considered as the “ticket” for lobbying, so the amount of contribution is
not correlated with the intensity of political involvement. Second, it is hard to obtain
data on individual wealth. So it is problematic to measure political involvement
without adjusting for personal wealth.
Our individual political orientation measure, Repit, is allowed to vary over time.
This is consistent with the revisionist views that the conception of partisanship is a
running tally of party utilities that is updated continuously according to the positions
of parties on different issues and personal evaluations of party performances (Bonica
(2014) Berry et al. (1998)).11 The time-varying characteristic of individual political
orientation provides important benefit in identification: it helps us distinguish our
effect of friendliness board from the channel of personal connection between CEO
and independent directors, since personal connections, once formed, are stable and
11In Lee, Lee and Nagarajan (2014), the authors assume that the individual political orientation
is either time-invariant or only adjusts smoothly from previous political orientation. This follows the
static view of individual political orientation common in early political science research.
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persistent over time.12
Using individual political orientation Repit, we construct the political homophily
index (PHI ) of the firm as follows:
PHIit = 1 −
|RepCEOit − RepIDit |
2
(2.2)
where RepCEOit is the political orientation index of the CEO of firm i in fiscal year
t, and RepIDit is the equal-weighted simple average of political orientation indices of
all independent directors of firm i in fiscal year t. By construction, PHI takes a value
between [0, 1], where a value of one (zero) indicates that the independent directors
share most (least) similar political orientation with the CEO, and are more (less)
friendly to the CEO. Similar to Rep index, we do not consider the total amount of
political contribution made by the all managers in PHI index. The political involve-
ment of the firm is usually taken through the corporate political action committee
(PAC) but not from individual donations. So the total amount of contribution is
less correlated with the similarity between the individual political orientation of the
CEO and the board 13
It is worth pointing out that the PHI measure (as well as RepCEO and RepID)
is less accurate when both the CEO and independent directors make 0 political
contribution. By our construction, such a case would yield a value of 1 for PHI
since both RepCEO and RepID would have a value of 0. However, it is still possible
that they have strong political leaning but lack of incentive to engage in political
activities, such as making political donations. Zero political contribution is also
likely to happen if the information reported in the FEC file is unrecognizable so
that we failed to match it to the CEO or director. In either case, the CEO and
the independent directors may not have precisely the same political orientation,
although the value of PHI indicates so. To address this concern, we include a Weak
12The baseline results are robust if we use political orientation measures following which in Lee,
Lee and Nagarajan (2014), i.e. assuming that individual political orientation is persistent over time.
We report the results using the robustness measures of individual political orientation in A.1
13The intensity of the political involvement may have impacts on the effect of PHI on crash risks.
We report the test for the effect of the political involvement of the firm in section A.2.
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PHI Dummy, which takes a value of 1 if both the CEO and independent directors
make 0 political contribution in our data, and 0 otherwise.
In Panel A of Table 2.1, we report the summary statistics of individual political
contributions and political indices. On average, a CEO spends $2, 078 per contribu-
tion, and an independent director spends $2, 349, both are significantly higher than
the minimum reporting threshold $200. The amount per contribution is slightly
higher to Democratic candidates and committees comparing to Republicans. In
terms of their political leaning, CEOs tend to be slightly conservative, with the av-
erage RepCEOit to be 0.12. The political orientation of independent directors is more
balanced distributed. The average RepIDit of independent directors of each firm is
0.02. The average PHI of the firms is around 0.81, which indicates that the political
orientation of CEOs and independent directors are overall very similar, consistent
with the findings in Lee, Lee and Nagarajan (2014).
2.2.3 Financial variables, board characteristics
The financial variables of the firm are based on the data from Compustat and CRSP
databases. The main variables of our interest is the crash risk. Following Chen,
Hong and Stein (2001), we construct two measures of crash risk using daily returns
obtained from CRSP database.
The first measure is the negative coefficient of skewness (NCSKEW), which is
calculated as:
NCSKEWit = −(n(n − 1) 32
∑





where Rit is the sequence of the market-adjusted returns to stock i during the
year t, and n is the number of observations on daily returns during the year t.
We use the down-to-up volatility of the firm (DUVOL) as an alternative measure
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of crash risk. It is constructed as:







where “down” indicates the days when the returns are below the mean of year t,
and “up” indicates the days when the returns are above the mean of year t. nu (nd)
is the number of up (down) days. DUVOL also measures the negative skewness of
the distribution of returns, but does not involve third moments and is less likely to
be extremely biased by few extreme days.
Both NCSKEW and DUVOL measure the asymmetries of returns. A higher
value of NCSKEW and DUVOL corresponds to a more left-skewed (negatively-
skewed) distribution and a higher risk of crashes.
The firm valuation Q is constructed as the ratio of the firm’s market value of as-
sets to its book value. Other financial variables we use in the following sections are:
return on assets (ROA), the market leverage ratios, capital expenditures (CAPX),
the natural logarithm of the book value of assets (log(Assets)), and research and
development (R&D). All the financial variables and measures of crash risks are
winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. The summary statistics are reported in Panel
B of Table 2.1. The figures of our financial variables are comparable to other re-
search which uses BoardEx firms, such as Knyazeva, Knyazeva and Masulis (2013),
Lee, Lee and Nagarajan (2014), among others.
We obtained the corporate governance data regarding institutional ownership,
the adoption of poison pills and staggered board, from the ISS database. We cal-
culate the Board Size as the number of total directors using the information from
BoardEx. Similar to the social connection measure used in Dasgupta, Zhang and
Zhu (2015), we construct the CEO-Directors Connection Strength as the fraction
of directors who have any social connection with the CEO identified using the bio-
graphic information provided by the BoardEx database. If the CEO has one of the
following two types of social connections with any director, we establish a social
connection between the CEO and that director: (1) they studied at the same insti-
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tution during an overlapped period; (2) they worked for the same employer other
than the current firm at least five years before the first year they have been reported
working in the current firm.
In Panel C of Table 2.1, we report the summary statistics of board characteris-
tics. In our sample, the average board has 10 directors. Around 48.9% of boards
adopt poison pills, and 57.3% of boards adopt staggered classes. The average insti-
tutional ownership is around 75.5%. More than 80% of the firms have no directors
socially connected with the CEO, resulting in the average CEO-Directors Connec-
tion Strength to be only 4.2%.
2.3 Results
2.3.1 Political alignment and crash risk
We first study the effect of political alignment on crash risk. We hypothesize that
political alignment between CEO and independent directors facilitates communica-
tion between them, especially when the firm faces negative shocks. When managers
and boards have similar political orientation, they will cooperate more and jointly
formulate policies that are in conformity with their common political priors. More-
over, boards are more willing to share the blame for bad outcomes since policies are
set jointly. If, however, independent directors are less friendly towards the CEO and
tougher in monitoring, then the CEO would hesitate to reveal negative information
in order to avoid board discipline. Since the CEO cannot withhold the informa-
tion forever, when the negative information is accumulated to be able to generate
large impact or when the market suffers from significant declines, negative informa-
tion is eventually going to be reflected into the stock prices. Therefore, the lack of
disclosure, especially about negative information, leads to negatively skewed stock
returns. If the alignment in political orientation makes independent directors more
friendly to the CEO so that the CEO is more willing to disclose negative informa-
tion, we would expect the returns of the firm to be less negatively skewed.
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To test this prediction, we regress crash risk on our measure of political align-
ment PHI. We first use NCSKEW, the Negative Coefficient of Skewness, to measure
crash risk.
NCSKEWi,t = a0 + a1PHIi,t−1 + Controls + εit (2.5)
The results are reported in Table 2.2. We control for firm fixed effects and year
fixed effects in all specifications, and cluster standard errors at the firm level. As
shown in Column 1, the coefficient of PHI in the regression is around −0.015 and
statistically significant at the 5% level. We include Board Size, 1-year lagged ROA
and Investment, R&D, log(Assets), Market Leverage, and CEO-Director Connection
Strength in the regression to control for factors that also affect the negative skewness
of the stock returns. The result suggests that better alignment of political orientation
is associated with lower crash risk (equivalently, less left-skewed stock returns). The
effect is also economically significant. For one standard deviation increase in PHI,
crash risk, measured by NCSKEW, is reduced by 0.002, whereas the sample mean
of NCSKEW is only around 0.001. However, the total explanatory power for the
cross-sectional variation of skewness is very low, since the adjusted R squared is
only 0.02. This is because the prediction power of the skewness of stock returns
mostly comes from time series variation. The explanatory power of our model with
PHI for cross-sectional variation of skewness is comparable to the findings in Chen,
Hong and Stein (2001).
In Column 2, we further include the Weak PHI Dummy to control for the case
that PHI equals to one because both CEO and independent directors make 0 political
contribution. Ideally, CEO and the board should have the highest political alignment
when PHI = 1. However, when individuals make no contribution in that year, their
political orientation are mechanically labeled as neutral, which could be potentially
biased. It is possible that individual does have political leaning, but (s)he did not
make any political contribution in the given year, or we simply could not match
her(his) information with the position in the firm. Therefore, for those cases, the
true political similarity is not as high as indicated in the PHI and the Weak PHI
Dummy captures the noisy part of PHI. We do find that the effect of PHI become
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stronger after controlling for Weak PHI Dummy as reported in Column 2. The
economic significance of the effect of PHI on the crash risk increases by almost
63%.
We then test our prediction with DUVOL, our second measure for crash risk. We
run a similar regression as in Equation 2.5.
DUVOLi,t = a0 + a1PHIi,t−1 + Controls + εit (2.6)
We control for firm fixed effects and year fixed effects in all specifications, and
cluster standard errors at the firm level. As reported in Column 3 and Column 4
of Table 2.2, the results are very similar to the ones with NCSKEW and are again
stronger after controlling for Weak PHI Dummy.14
Overall, we find very consistent results that crash risk is reduced when the CEO
and independent directors are better aligned in their political orientations. In con-
trast, having prior (social) connections with the board may be mainly associated
with less monitoring of the manager and cannot prevent bad outcomes from hap-
pening. In line with this prediction, we find that connections between the CEO and
the directors do not help reduce crash risks.
2.3.2 Firm valuation
If lower crash risk can be priced, then we would expect board friendliness to be
associated with higher firm value. In this section, we empirically examine whether
this is the case.15
14It is interesting to see if the effect of PHI is stronger for the firms which are more involved in
political activities. In this case, whether a firm has a registered Corporate Political Action Committee
(Corporate PAC)could serve as dummy variable measuring the political involvement of the firm. In
the section A.2 we report the results for including the interaction of PHI and Corporate PAC in
our baseline regression. The results show that the effect of PHI is not stronger for more politically
involved firms.
15Lee, Lee and Nagarajan (2014) argue that political alignment impedes board independence and
hurt firm value. In subsection 2.3.4, we examine the effect of political alignment under different
corporate governance mechanisms.
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Specifically, we run the following regression:
Qi,t = a0 + a1PHIi,t−1 + Controls + εit (2.7)
The results are reported in Table 2.3. We control for firm fixed effects and year
fixed effects in all specifications, and cluster standard errors at the firm level. Col-
umn 1 shows the result without any other control variable, and Column 2 shows
the results with control variables, including textitBoard Size, 1-year lagged ROA
and Investment, R&D, log(Assets), Market Leverage, and CEO-Director Connec-
tion Strength. The coefficients for PHI in both columns are significantly negative.
The magnitude of the coefficient of PHI is also comparable to which in Lee, Lee
and Nagarajan (2014) (−0.18 vs −0.22) .16 The signs of control variables are consis-
tent with expectations. For example, Board size has a negative effect on firm value,
which is consistent with the results presented in Yermack (1996). Lagged ROA and
Investment are positively correlated with Q and the coefficients are statistically sig-
nificant at 1% level. log(Assets) and Market Leverage are negatively correlated with
Q at the 1% level of statistical significance. It is worth noting that the CEO-Director
Connection Strength has a negative effect on Q, although only marginally signifi-
cant, consistent with the common view that stronger social connection impedes the
effectiveness of board monitoring and hurts firm value.
The above results appear to suggest that the alignment in political orientation
between CEO and independent directors decreases firm value. However, in Column
3, when we additionally control for the case that PHI equals to one because of the 0
political contributions (Weak PHI Dummy), the coefficient of PHI in the regression
of Q becomes positive and statistically significant. By construction of PHI, it takes
a value of 1 when both CEO and independent directors make 0 political contribution
(because RepCEO and RepID both take the value of 0). In this case, the CEO and in-
dependent directors may NOT have exactly the same political orientation, although
16In untabulated analysis, we also control for the RepCEO to capture the marginal effect of politi-
cal alignment, following Lee, Lee and Nagarajan (2014). The coefficient of PHI is still significantly
negative. The coefficient for RepCEO is negative but not statistically significant.
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the value of PHI appears so. For firms with Weak PHI Dummy taking a value of 1,
around 90% of the CEOs and independent directors have never made any political
contribution. Therefore the Republican index based on political contribution be-
comes less accurate for these individuals, and it is not surprising that the coefficient
of Weak PHI Dummy is negative and statistically significant, making the net effect
of PHI to be almost zero.
When controlling for Weak PHI Dummy, the positive coefficient of PHI suggests
that the political alignment between CEO and independent directors is associated
with higher firm value for firms whose CEO and directors actively make political
contributions. The effect of political alignment on firm value under this specifica-
tion is economically significant. The point estimate of 0.21 indicates that for a one
standard deviation (0.13) increase in PHI, Q would increase by 0.0273, correspond-
ing to 1.7% of the sample average (1.618).
2.3.3 Causality tests
The composition of the board is never an exogenous decision to the firm. It is
possible that certain (unobserved) firm characteristics or shareholder preferences
may drive both the political alignment and the crash risk of the firm. In this case,
we would obtain a correlation between the PHI and the crash risk even when PHI
does not affect the crash risk. To mitigate the endogeneity problem, we construct an
instrumental variable for the change in firm PHI using the change in local political
homogeneity (Local PHI) and perform a two-stage least squares estimation to verify
our results.
Since independent directors are likely to be selected from the local business
community (Knyazeva, Knyazeva and Masulis (2013)), we expect the political lean-
ing of the local population to affect the expression of political leaning of indepen-
dent directors .17 We measure Local PHI as:
17It is possible that big companies can recruit nation wide so the local political environment has
little affect on the firm level political similarity. In order to address this concern, we further run
the IV test on a subsample which only includes the firms with total assets in the top quartile. The
results of this robustness test still hold. They are reported in section A.3. Since we drop the Weak
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Local PHIs,t = |Local Reps,t − Local Dems,t| (2.8)
where Local Reps,t (Local Dems,t) represents the percentage of voting shares re-
ceived by all Republican (Democratic) candidates in the most recent federal election
cycle to year t in state s.18 Therefore, Local PHI measures the absolute difference
between the votes received by the two major parties in a federal election cycle. A
higher Local PHI indicates that one party dominates with majority votes, which we
usually observe in the so-called “Safe States” where one party has a base of sup-
port from which they can draw a sufficient share of the electorate. On the contrary,
a lower Local PHI indicates that the votes obtained by Republican or Democratic
candidates are very close in a federal election cycle. This pattern can be often ob-
served in the battleground states or so-called “Swing States” where the elections are
competitive.
In the first stage, we regress the change of PHI on the change of Local PHI,
allowing the effect to differ between “Safe States” and “Swing States”.
∆PHIi,t = a0 + a1∆Local PHIs,t × Safe State Dummys,t−1+
a2∆Local PHIs,t × Swing State Dummys,t−1 + a3PHIi,t−1 + Controls + εit (2.9)
where safe states are defined as states in which Local PHI is above the median
and swing states are defined as states with a Local PHI below the median. The
Safe State Dummy (Swing State Dummy) takes a value of 1 if the firm headquarter
locates in a safe(swing) state, and 0 otherwise. To adjust for the misreporting in
the historical states of incorporation and location in Compustat database, we use
the parsed 10-K data from Bill McDonald’s website19 to identify the firm headquar-
ter. We include lagged PHI to control for the mechanical reversal of PHI since it
PHI Dummy observations from the baseline regression, the remaining firms are in general bigger.
Therefore, we can see that keeping the top quartile firms in terms of size only reduce the sample size
to about half in our baseline IV test.
18Since some candidates may be from parties other than Republican and Democratic, the sum of
Local Repi,t and Local Demi,t does not necessarily equal to one.
19https://sraf.nd.edu/data/augmented-10-x-header-data/.
24
is bounded between [0, 1] and include the same set of control variables as in the
baseline regressions in the previous subsection. In addition, unlike in the baseline
regression, we are not able to control for Weak PHI Dummy. Therefore, we drop all
the observations with Weak PHI Dummy = 1 in the [-1, 1] year window, leaving us
a much smaller sample comparing to the baseline regression.
In Column 1 of Table 2.4, we present the result for the first stage regression. We
find that the impact of ∆Local PHI on ∆PHI indeed depends on the political envi-
ronment of the state: ∆Local PHI affects the firm’s ∆PHI positively in safe states,
but negatively in swing states. This result is consistent with findings in political
science studies. More specifically, a decrease in Local PHI in those safe states
implies a less safe position for the dominating party and higher uncertainty in the
forthcoming election. In this situation, voters have a higher tendency to participate
as the prior belief that their votes are pivotal is increased (Lindbeck and Weibull
(1987), Duffy and Tavits (2008)), leading to less predictable electoral outcomes and
greater discrepancy in political ideology among people. Therefore, a decrease in
∆Local PHI predicts a decrease in the firm’s ∆PHI in safe states. For swing states,
however, unexpected electoral outcomes are more likely to occur when Local PHI
increases (i.e., one party gains a more dominating position). Thus, an increase in
∆Local PHI leads to higher voter participation and a decrease in firm’s ∆PHI in
swing states.
The coefficients are both statistically significant for the safe states and swing
states, and the F-statistic for the instrument variables is about 18.392. This sug-
gests that we do not have a weak instrument problem. The coefficient of PHIi,t−1
is negative and statistically significant, suggesting that there is a strong reversal
mechanism for PHI. Moreover, while it is possible that election outcomes affect the
local economy, as different parties have different preference over inflation and un-
employment (see Garfinkel and Review (1994)), it is less likely that the change in
local political homophily, ∆Local PHI, directly correlates with the change in crash
risk and have an opposite effect in safe and swing states. Therefore, our instrument
variable satisfies the exclusion conditions.
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We present the results of the second stage regression in Column 2-4 of Table 2.4.
In Column 2 and 3, we report the results for the crash risks measures. We are able
to obtain very consistent results that board friendliness lowers the risk of crashes
in stock price. In Column 4, we show that the effect of PHI on Q is not signifi-
cant under the IV 2SLS regression. Thus, it is possible that omitted variables may
drive firms’ decision to hire CEO and independent directors with similar political
orientation and a higher valuation. However, in contrast to Lee, Lee and Nagarajan
(2014), our results reject the prediction that director friendliness hurts firm value.
We also conduct the overidentifying restrictions test since we are using three in-
strument variables for one endogenous variable. Under the null hypothesis of the
validity of the instruments, this J-test has a χ2(2) distribution. For all of our models,
we pass the hypothesis that all instruments are exogenous at the level of 10%.
2.3.4 Board Friendliness and Corporate Governance
A natural question that appears is how the effect of political alignment on crash risk
and firm value interacts with corporate governance mechanisms. The answer to this
question is not obvious from an ex ante point of view. On the one hand, independent
directors receive heavier pressure from shareholders under stronger governance and
may have a higher incentive to acquire information from the CEO. It thus predicts
that better political alignment would be more effective in reducing the firm’s crash
risk when the firm adopts strong corporate governance structures. On the other
hand, stronger corporate governance structures may deter the CEO’s willingness to
share information with the board. As hypothesized in Adams and Ferreira (2007),
the CEO faces a trade-off when s/he decides whether to disclose information to
the board or not. If the CEO shares information with the board, s/he is able to
gain better advice. However, sharing private information imposes costs to the CEO
as a more informed board would monitor the CEO more intensively. So, when
the corporate governance structure is weaker (the independent directors are poorer
monitors or the CEO is more entrenched), the CEO would be less worried about
the discipline from the independent directors when s/he disclose more information.
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In addition, when the CEO and directors face lighter shareholder pressure, they
may be encouraged to build a culture that facilitates long-term strategic planning.
Thus, it is also possible that the benefit of a friendly board is stronger when the
corporate governance structure is weak. Therefore, we examine the relationship
between corporate governance and the effect of board friendliness empirically in
this section.
We first split the firms into two subsamples based on whether a staggered board
is adopted or not. The staggered board is commonly viewed as a weak corporate
governance structure. It also has a controversial implication on firm value. For
example, Faleye (2007) and Bebchuk and Cohen (2005) find that classified boards
are associated with more management entrenchment and less director effectiveness.
Cremers, Litov and Sepe (2017), however, argue that staggered boards enhance the
incentive of directors to build a stable relationship with executives. By examining
how information sharing works with and without a staggered board, we contribute
to the understanding of a specific channel for the staggered board to affect firm
value.
We repeat the tests for the two subsamples. In all regressions, we use the same
control variables as in the previous sections. To minimize the effect of noise in the
measure of PHI, we also include Weak PHI Dummy for all specifications..20 The
results are presented in Panel A of Table 2.5. The effect of PHI on both measures
of crash risk is not significant for the firms that adopt a staggered board. For firms
without a staggered board, the coefficient of PHI is negative and statistically sig-
nificant. The magnitude of the effect is also doubled to the magnitude we obtained
from the whole sample. This finding supports the conjecture that the friendly board
benefits the firm more under stronger governance structures when the board is not
classified. We find no evidence that political alignment can reduce crash risk when
the board is staggered.
Similarly, there is almost no effect of PHI on Q for the firms with a staggered
board. However, for the firms without a staggered board, the effect of PHI on Q is
20All the results hold if we do not include the Weak PHI Dummy
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positive and significant. The point estimation of 0.499 is doubled in the magnitude
of the coefficient we obtained in the previous section for the whole sample.
Next, we examine the effect of a friendly board when the firm adopts both a
staggered board and a poison pill. Faleye (2007) find that management is entrenched
the most when combining staggered board and poison pill since blending the two
provisions ensures that a firm can only be the consent of its directors. In Panel
B of Table 2.5, we present the results of subsample regressions. Consistent with
the previous findings, the coefficient of PHI is not significant in the subsample of
firms with both a staggered board and a poison pill. The effect of PHI remains for
the firms not simultaneously adopting a staggered board and a poison pill. These
results show that the friendly board has no effect on firm value and crash risk if the
directors and executives are shielded from potential discipline, and can benefit the
firm when the managers are disciplined.
Finally, we partition the sample into halves based on the percentage of institu-
tional ownership. The institutional investors have been argued to be one of the most
important party who undertake monitoring over executives and also directors. Fol-
lowing similar logic, we test if the effect of PHI on crash risks is stronger for firms
with higher institutional ownership. As shown in Panel C of Table 2.5, the negative
association between PHI and crash risks only presents for firms with higher than
average institutional ownership. We do not find any significant effect of PHI for the
firms with lower than average institutional ownership. We find similar results for
firm value. These findings are consistent with the results that the friendly board can
only benefit the firm when the governance structure is strong.
An important takeaway of our results is that board friendliness in itself does not
imply weak governance. On the contrary, when combines with strong shareholder
protections and less management entrenchment, the friendly board can facilitate
information sharing and reduces crash risk. This distinction sets board friendliness
apart from board independence measures.
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2.4 Evidence on Insider Tradings
Open market tradings made by the CEO and the independent directors are believed
to be informative. Ravina and Sapienza (2010) find that both executives and in-
dependent directors earn positive substantial abnormal returns when they purchase
their company stock. Moreover, executives on average earn more than indepen-
dent directors when they make open market purchases, indicating that there is a gap
between the information held by the CEO and the independent directors. In this
section, we examine the returns of insider tradings by the CEO and the independent
directors to further test if political alignment ease information sharing between the
CEO and the independent directors.
Using data from the TFN Insider Filing, we empirically test if a higher politi-
cal alignment between the CEO and the independent directors is associated with a
smaller gap between the trading returns of open market purchases made by CEO
and independent directors.21 Specifically, we run the following regression:
Rpurchase = a0 + a1Trade Size + a2ID + a3PHIt−1+
a4Trade Size × ID + a5Trade Size × PHIt−1 + a6PHIt−1 × ID+
a7Trade Size × ID × PHIt−1 + a8PHIt−1 + a9Weak PHI Dummyt−1 +Controls + εit
(2.10)
where Rpurchase denotes the replicating returns of the open market purchases
made by the CEO and independent directors. Trade Size is the transaction size
as a fraction of total market capitalization multiply by 100 to make it a number in
percentage. ID is a dummy variable indicating whether the purchase is made by in-
dependent directors. It takes a value of 1 if the purchase is made by the independent
directors, and 0 otherwise. The control variables are Board Size, 1-year lagged ROA
and Investment, R&D, log(Assets), Market Leverage, and CEO-Director Connection
Strength. In all regressions, we cluster standard errors at the firm level. In addition,
21We focus only on open market purchases, since sales may be driven by diversification motives
or liquidity needs and are thereby less informative.
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we include firm and year fixed effects to control for any unobserved variation of
insider trading gains across firms and time respectively.
We control for the size of the transaction for two reasons. First, it is possible that
the size of the transaction is correlated with the incentive to trade better (Ravina and
Sapienza (2010)). If the CEO or the independent director tend to make larger open
market purchases, then we would observe higher returns for the group. Second, as
documented in Fidrmuc, Goergen and Renneboog (2006), bigger transactions made
by insiders indicate a higher likelihood that the insider is trading based on private
information and generate larger price impact. Therefore, we include the interaction
of Trade Size and ID in all regressions in order to investigate the marginal effect of
transaction size to the difference in return earned by the CEOs and the independent
directors.
In Table 2.6, we report the results for the market-adjusted returns of an indi-
vidual’s long position for 0, 30, 60, 90, 180 trading days. We find evidence sup-
porting Ravina and Sapienza (2010). The positive constant indicates that insiders
profit from open market purchases. On average, mimicking the CEO’s long posi-
tion yields a 7.5% market-adjusted return in 60 days. If we look at 180 trading days
horizon, the gain increases to 16.3%. Since SEC requires insiders to surrender any
profit made on transactions that are offset within six months, it is more interesting
to look at the 180 trading day horizon. Yet for all holding horizons, the constants
are statistically significant at the 1% level, suggesting that the insiders, in general,
have more information comparing to the market. Moreover, we find that the coeffi-
cients of ID are negative and statistically significant in all holding horizons except
overnight. This suggests that on average independent directors earn less abnormal
returns comparing to CEOs, which is consistent with our expectation that the quan-
tity of information acquired by independent directors is less than the private infor-
mation acquired by the CEOs. The results are obtained after controlling for Trade
Size. Therefore the higher abnormal return earned by CEOs is not fully explained
by the transaction size difference between CEO and independent directors.
To investigate our hypothesis that political alignment between CEO and inde-
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pendent directors reduce the information gap between them, we include both PHI
and the triple interaction of Trade Size, ID, and PHI in our regressions. The coeffi-
cients of PHI are not statistically significant, indicating that having a friendly board
does not widen the information gap between insiders and the market. The triple
interaction of PHI with Trade Size and ID has a positive coefficient for the 60, 90,
and 180 trading days horizon and is statistically significant. The point estimate of
0.008 offsets about 31% of the point estimate of −0.026 for ID. The results con-
firm that political alignment between the CEO and the independent directors does
increase the quantity of information acquired by independent directors. The effect
of PHI is stronger when the size of insider tradings is larger. This is consistent with
the conjecture that a friendly board is more desired when directors have a stronger
incentive to acquire information from the CEO.
For similar concerns as in previous sections, we control the Weak PHI Dummy
to reduce the impact of noise from cases when neither the CEO or the independent
director made political contributions. The interaction of Weak PHI Dummy with
Trade Size and ID is also included in all regressions. We do not find the Weak PHI
Dummy to have any significant effect on the abnormal returns earned by insider
tradings.
2.5 Conclusion
The increasing importance of board oversight has required greater board engage-
ment and better communications with managers. Yet, the literature does not pro-
vide much guidance on how directors can better acquire firm-specific information,
given that many board members are “independent” and have full-time jobs in other
corporations.
In this chapter, we examine “friendliness” in terms of political similarity and
study whether board friendliness reduces crash risk. Our hypothesis is that simi-
larity in the political orientation of the CEO and board helps facilitate information
sharing and reduces crash risk. When managers and boards have similar political
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orientation, they will cooperate more and jointly formulate policies that are in con-
formity with their common political priors. This suggests more information sharing,
including information on bad outcomes in a timely manner, reducing the costs on
the CEO for sharing information, and also leads to lower crash risks. We measure
friendliness by the Political Homophily Index (PHI ), which captures the similar-
ity of political orientations of managers and directors. We find that firms’ crash
risk decreases in political homophily. The results are robust when we instrument
the change in PHI by the change in local political homogeneity. Our results sug-
gest that better alignment in political orientations facilitates information sharing,
including information on bad outcomes in a timely manner. The effect is more pro-
nounced when firms have stronger corporate governance mechanisms and directors











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.2. Friendly Board and Crash Risk
The table reports the results of friendly board and crash risk. The dependent variable is crash risk,
measured by the negative coefficient of skewness (NCSKEW) and to down-to-up volatility (DU-
VOL), both capturing the negative skewness of the stock returns. The main explanatory variable is
the Political Homophily Index (PHI), which measures the friendliness between the independent di-
rectors and CEO. In Column 1 and 3, we control for Board Size, 1-year lagged ROA and Investment,
R&D, log(Assets), Market Leverage, and CEO-Director Connection Strength. In Column 2 and 4,
we further include the Weak PHI Dummy to control for the cases when both the CEO and indepen-
dent directors made no contribution. We include firm fixed effects and year fixed effects in all the
regressions. The standard errors are clustered at the firm level in all columns. The t-statistics for each
estimated coefficient are reported in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ ∗ ∗ denote the statistical significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
35
NCSKEW Duvol
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PHI -0.0146** -0.0238** -0.0176* -0.0298**
(-2.01) (-2.24) (-1.80) (-2.15)
Weak PHI Dummy 0.00579 0.00698
(1.39) (1.29)
Board Size -0.00105** -0.000960* -0.00129* -0.00127*
(-2.02) (-1.77) (-1.77) (-1.74)
ROA 0.00274 0.00817 0.00871 0.00826
(0.14) (0.39) (0.33) (0.31)
Capx 0.00939 0.0112 0.00892 0.00893
(0.81) (0.86) (0.56) (0.56)
R&D -0.0292 -0.0378 -0.0128 -0.0140
(-0.56) (-0.72) (-0.18) (-0.19)
log(Assets) -0.00204 -0.00395 -0.00294 -0.00293
(-0.54) (-0.89) (-0.57) (-0.57)
Market Leverage -0.0207 -0.0265 -0.0166 -0.0173
(-1.30) (-1.51) (-0.77) (-0.80)
CEO-Directors Connection Strength 0.00491 0.00542 0.00482 0.00471
(1.52) (1.63) (1.08) (1.06)
N 10986 10986 11796 11796
Adj R-square 0.001 0.019 -0.000 -0.000
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 2.3. Friendly Board and Firm Valuation
The table reports the results of friendly board and firm valuation. The dependent variable is firm
valuation measured by Q. The main explanatory variable is the Political Homophily Index (PHI),
which measures the friendliness between the independent directors and CEO. In Column 2 and 3,
we control for Board Size, 1-year lagged ROA and Investment, R&D, log(Assets), Market Leverage,
and CEO-Director Connection Strength. In Column 3, we further include the Weak PHI Dummy to
control for the cases when both the CEO and independent directors made no contribution. We include
firm fixed effects and year fixed effects in all the regressions. The standard errors are clustered at the
firm level in all columns. The t-statistics for each estimated coefficient are reported in parentheses.
∗, ∗∗, and ∗ ∗ ∗ denote the statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Q
(1) (2) (3)
PHI -0.182*** -0.178*** 0.211**
(-2.67) (-2.89) (2.17)
Weak PHI Dummy -0.223***
(-4.86)










Market Leverage -2.496*** -2.475***
(-11.90) (-12.02)
CEO-Directors Connection Strength -0.0274 -0.0240
(-1.36) (-1.21)
Number of Observations 11944 11944 11944
Adj R-square 0.481 0.702 0.704
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
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Table 2.4. Instrument Variable Regression
The table reports the 2SLS regression results using the change in local political homophily index
(Local PHI) and state political status as the instruments. In this sample, we only include the ob-
servations with non-zero weak PHI dummy, i.e. either CEO or independent directors have recent
contribution record. The Local PHI is constructed as Local PHI = abs(Rep local − Dem local)
where Rep local is the fraction of the voting share received by the Republican candidate in the most
recent election year, and Dem local is the voting share received by the Democratic candidates in the
most recent federal election year. The Safe State Dummy takes a value of 1 if Local PHI is above
the median, and 0 otherwise. The Swing State Dummy takes a value of 1 if Local PHI is below the
median, and 0 otherwise. In Column 1, the first-stage regression result is reported. In Columns 2,
3, and 4, the second-stage regression results for the change in negative coefficient skewness, change
in down-to-up volatility, and the change in Q are reported respectively. The control variables in all
columns are Board Size, one year lagged ROA, one year lagged investment, Market Leverage, R&D,
log(Assets), and CEO-Directors Connection Strength. The standard errors are clustered within firm
level. The t-statistics for each estimated coefficient are reported in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ ∗ ∗
denote the statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
First-Stage Second-Stage
∆PHI ∆NCSKEW ∆DUVOL ∆Q
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆Local PHI × Safe State Dummy 0.0589*
(1.77)




∆PHI (2SLS IV) -0.107** -0.128** -0.0286
(-2.25) (-1.98) (-0.22)
F-statistic 18.392
J-statistic (p − value) 0.86 0.79 0.82
Number of Observations 2415 2415 2415 2415
Adj R-square 0.278 -0.111 -0.113 0.156
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.6. Political Alignment and Insider Tradings
This table reports the effect of board friendliness on insider purchasing returns. The dependent
variable is the market-adjusted return of an individual’s long position for 0, 30, 60, 90, and 180
trading days, respectively. The variable Independent Director is a dummy equal to 1 if the individual
is an independent director, but not an executive officer. Trade Size is the transaction size measured
by the fraction of market capitalization multiplied by 100. PHI is the firm level political homophily
index between the CEO and independent directors. Weak PHI dummy takes a value of 1 if CEO and
independent directors make no political contribution. The control variables in all columns are Board
Size, one year lagged ROA, one year lagged investment, Market Leverage, R&D, log(Assets), and
CEO-Directors Connection Strength. The standard errors are clustered within the same individual.
The t-statistics for each estimated coefficient are reported in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ ∗ ∗ denote the
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Ret(t) Ret(t+30) Ret(t+60) Ret(t+90) Ret(t+180)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant 0.004*** 0.051*** 0.075*** 0.094*** 0.163***
(4.23) (6.18) (6.81) (6.72) (7.31)
Trade Size 0.001* 0.003 0.013 0.022* 0.011***
(1.83) (1.15) (1.48) (1.82) (3.42)
Independent Director -0.001 -0.006* -0.013** -0.017*** -0.024***
(-0.87) (-1.83) (-2.25) (-2.81) (-3.21)
Independent Director × PHI 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.008 0.006
(0.25) (0.93) (0.79) (1.12) (0.96)
Independent Director × Trade Size -0.002 0.001 -0.003 -0.007* 0.008
(-1.13) (0.55) (-0.79) (-1.84) (1.03)
Trade Size × PHI -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.007* -0.003*
(-1.11) (-0.75) (-1.33) (-1.82) (-1.78)
Trade Size × Independent Director 0.000 0.003 0.003* 0.005** 0.011**
× PHI (0.52) (0.48) (1.79) (1.98) (2.32)
PHI 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.005 0.009
(0.15) (0.08) (0.74) (0.98) (1.13)
Weak PHI Dummy 0.000 0.000 0.002 -0.003 -0.005
(0.05) (0.37) (0.88) (-0.47) (-0.82)
Number of Observations 101,696 101,696 101,696 101,696 101,696
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj R-square 0.13 0.16 0.16 0.21 0.27
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Chapter 3
Relative Performance Evaluation and
Strategic Competition
3.1 Introduction
Relative performance evaluation (RPE) is an evaluation of an individual’s perfor-
mance that is based on peer performance. It is widely regarded in the literature on
optimal contracts as an efficient tool to incentivize CEO effort. This efficacy arises
because comparisons between competing agents can serve as a device to filter out
common shocks and thus extract information about effort (Holmstro¨m, 1979, 1982).
While the use of RPE reduces the executives’ exposure to risk, it provides incentives
for them to take actions that influence peer performance. In other words, RPE places
a negative weight on the industry’s performance, so a CEO receives higher compen-
sation if peers in the industry perform worse (Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999). In this
chapter, we consider these incentives for strategic interactions induced by RPE in
executive compensation contracts. Specifically, we aim to examine how and to what
extent the use of RPE affects industry competition.
However, two challenges arise in studying the effects of RPE on CEO incentives
for strategic interactions. First, it is hard to measure the actual use of RPE. Proxy
disclosures, under the SEC’s 2006 executive compensation disclosure rules, provide
useful information on specific contractual terms of RPE in public U.S. firms, but
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using such information to construct a measure of the use of RPE is complicated.
For example, some firms tie RPE to a discretionary part of compensation and do
not disclose it (Gong, Li and Shin, 2011; De Angelis and Grinstein, 2014). In other
words, mandatory disclosures of RPE convey information about the explicit use of
RPE, while leaving out the implicit use. Second, just as finding instruments for peer
effects is challenging, it is also difficult to find a source of exogenous variation in the
use of RPE, that is, a shock to the use of RPE that is exogenous to the industry-level
competition.
To address these challenges, we examine the effects of using RPE in CEO com-
pensation contracts by estimating a dynamic game of competition in an oligopoly
market where CEOs, under given contracts, make entry-exit decisions to maximize
their utility. We use observed market entry-exit decisions and CEO compensation
contracts to infer the use of RPE and its impact on strategic interactions. This ap-
proach is appealing for two reasons. First, it helps us identify competitive effects
by modeling the strategic interactions explicitly and imposing this structure on the
data. Second, the theoretical framework allows us to conduct counterfactual ex-
periments and thus to quantify the effects of RPE on CEO incentives for strategic
interactions.
We develop and estimate a parsimonious dynamic game of competition with het-
erogeneous firms in an oligopoly market where CEOs, under given contracts, make
entry-exit decisions to maximize their expected discounted inter-temporal utilities,
taking as given their expectations about competitor actions. The model is based on
a dynamic discrete choice structural framework (Aguirregabiria and Mira, 2010),
in which firms make simultaneous moves but in which a CEO’s market entry-exit
decisions are dynamic or forward looking.1 These decisions affect other firms’ prof-
its through their effect on equilibrium variable profits. Because RPE makes CEO
1The dynamic discrete choice structural framework developed by Aguirregabiria and Mira
(2010) is widely used in dynamic game literature. Since the entry-exit decision is the simplest
strategy that players can make in competition across multiple markets, several papers are using a
similar framework to answer various questions. For example, in Gallant, Hong and Khwaja (2017)
the authors look at the entry-exit decision in generic drug industry to study the spillover effect of
competition. Aguirregabiria and Ho (2012) study the contribution of demand, costs, and strategic
factors to the adoption of hub-and-spoke networks in the US airline industry.
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compensation less sensitive to market conditions, managers, under RPE contracts,
make entry-exit decisions while facing a tradeoff between the reduction in compen-
sation based on market conditions, and the gain from being compared to competing
agents. Therefore, the effects of RPE on CEO incentives for strategic competition
depend not only on market conditions, but also on the firm’s comparative advantage
relative to its peers.
In this setting, we find that the use of RPE has an asymmetric effect on entry-exit
decisions depending on market conditions: it decreases (increases) the probability
of being active under bad (good) market conditions. Specifically, under bad market
conditions, managers under RPE contracts benefit from being punished less for their
bad performance and therefore are reluctant to operate in the market. In contrast,
managers under RPE contracts lose out on the opportunity to free-ride on good
market conditions. Instead, they benefit more from being compared to similarly
well-performing peers and therefore are motivated to operate in the market. The
use of RPE provides higher incentives to airlines with lower fixed operating costs
to operate in the market; that is, RPE tends to increase more (decrease less) the
probability of being active under good (bad) market conditions.
We estimate the model using data from the Airline Origin and Destination Sur-
vey (DB1B) of the U.S. Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS). The DB1B sur-
vey is a sample of 10% of all airline tickets from the large certified carriers in the
United States. We use the information on quantities, prices, and route entry and exit
decisions for every airline company operating in the routes between the 50 largest
U.S. metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs). The dataset is ideal for two reasons.
First, by treating a route as a market, we are able to observe the entry-exit decisions
for all players in the airline industry. Observations of the entry-exit decisions at
the market level are crucial for us to infer information about strategic interactions.
Second, by focusing within a single industry, we can conduct the analysis with-
out considering possible industry misclassifications (see, for example, Jayaraman,
Milbourn and Seo, 2015).
Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) contains the first theoretical examination of strate-
45
gic interactions induced by RPE. They show that the use of RPE depends on whether
competition is Bertrand or Cournot. They also find an empirical correlation between
the use of RPE and industry structure, as measured by the usual Herfindahl index.
More recently, Anto´n et al. (2016) touch upon the incentives for strategic competi-
tion induced by the use of RPE. However, they are interested in whether common
ownership helps explain variation in the use of RPE, and they tackle the question us-
ing reduced-form empirical methods. We examine a different but related question,
namely, how the use of RPE influences industry competition. In addition, we take a
different approach by estimating a dynamic discrete choice structural model. This
strategy allows us to provide a quantitative assessment of the direct link between
the use of RPE and subsequent competition outcomes.
3.2 Model
In this section, we present a parsimonious dynamic game of competition with het-
erogeneous airlines in an oligopoly market where CEOs, under given contracts,
make entry-exit decisions to maximize their expected discounted inter-temporal
utilities. We start with a description of the industry market structure and then move
to the specification of CEO compensation. Finally, we discuss the optimization
problem and its solution.
3.2.1 Competition
The industry is characterized by N airlines and M markets. A market is defined as
a non-directional city-pair, that is, if an airline operates flights from A to B, then it
should operate flights from B to A.
At each time t, airline i earns profits piimt, which depend on three state variables
and one choice variable. The three state variables can be divided into two groups.
The first group comprises market size, as well as common knowledge among all
airlines including incumbency status of airlines at time t. The second group consists
of private information an airline receives before making decisions. Based on the set
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of state variables, CEOs decide whether to operate in the market m at time t + 1.
The airline’s incumbency status is denoted by a binary variable ximt ∈ {0, 1},
which is equal to one if it operates in market m at time t, and zero otherwise. If
airline i operates in the market m at time t, i.e., ximt = 1, we refer to it as an in-
cumbent airline. It competes with other incumbent airlines and earns equilibrium
revenues ymt that are determined by market conditions and the number of incum-
bents in market m at time t. Specifically, the revenues that the incumbent airline i
earns are expressed as:




In (3.1), smt, referred to as “market size,” represents exogenous market condi-
tions of market m at time t that evolve according to a Markov process. The vector
xmt = {ximt : i = 1, 2, · · · ,N} contains information on the number of incumbent
airlines, which we denote as nmt. The revenue function consists of two components
that reflect the impact of demand and competition respectively. The impact of de-
mand is captured by γs. The larger is γs, the more sensitive is variable profit to the
market size, smt. The impact of competition is captured by γn. A large γn leads to
more intense strategic interaction.2 Note that in the model, the intensity of compe-
tition is characterized by the number of airlines present in the market. This feature
of the model allows us to avoid imposing price or quantity competition structure,
which may or may not be a reasonable assumption .3
The revenue ymt captures the normalized revenue with market characteristic sm
earned by an incumbent airline. The incumbent airline i also pays fixed operat-
2The impact of competition γn is an average effect of competition on the number of player in the
market. So we simply assume that the marginal effect by increasing one player in different market is
the same
3Generally speaking, this model captures a reduced form of competition. Rather than explicitly
model the choice of price or quantity of each player, we assume a static competition structure, that is
we take equilibrium price and quantity decision as given once the firm has taken entry-exit decision.
The only variable we need is the total market demand (market size) and the sensitivity of profit to
market demand. Thus, we do not need our market structure to be strictly Cournot competition or
Bertrand competition.
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ing costs fim that are airline- and market-specific. These costs thus capture time
invariant airline heterogeneity across markets.
On the other hand, if airline i stays out of the market m at time t, i.e., ximt = 0,
we refer to it as a potential entrant. It gets zero profits. If airline i does not operate
in market m, it can put its capital elsewhere. The profits of airline i are equal to the
value of the best outside option. However, as the outside option is airline and market
specific, it cannot be identified separately from the average fixed cost fim. Therefore
we normalize it to zero following, for example, Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007).
Hereafter, the fixed cost fim should be interpreted as including the opportunity costs.
Profits depend also on private information imt that is revealed to airline i before
it makes its decision. The private information is choice-specific and is an inde-
pendent and identically distributed extreme value type I random variable, with zero
mean and unit dispersion. This assumption is standard in dynamic discrete choice
frameworks.4
Finally, airline i can decide whether to remain in the market at time t + 1. The
decision whether to enter or exit the market m next period is denoted by aimt, which
is equal to one if the airline enters the market, and zero otherwise. By definition,
xim,t+1 = aimt, but it is convenient to use different letters to distinguish state and
choice variables. Once airline i decides to enter, it has to pay entry costs em that are
market-specific and homogeneous across airlines and time. The entry costs, em, are
paid only when the airline is not active in market m at period t and when it decides
to operate in the market next period, i.e., if ximt = 0 and aimt = 1. The new entrant
is not active until the next period. The exiting airline is operative during time t and
incurs no exit costs.5
The time line of events is as follows. At time t, airlines are characterized by their
4Permitting serial correlation in the privately observed shock would give rise to models of learn-
ing in which players form beliefs about other players’ states based on past actions. To model these
beliefs consistently, the state space would need to be amplified to include the set of all possible past
actions. As such serial correlation is likely to render the method computationally infeasible. See, for
example Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008), for a detailed discussion.
5It has been commonly discussed that barriers to exit are high in the airline industry. This is
because airplanes are very specific assets and have little scrap value. However, we refer to exit a
non-directional city pair rather than the entire business.
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own incumbency status in market m. After the realization of the demand shock smt,
which is common knowledge among all airlines, and the private shock imt, which is
choice-specific and is only observed by each airline, airlines earn revenues and pay
operating costs depending on their incumbency status. CEOs then decide simultane-
ously whether to operate in the market at time t+1, taking as given their expectations
about peer actions, to maximize their expected discounted inter-temporal utilities.
The profits of an airline i that decides to stay out of market m at time t + 1,
piimt(aimt = 0), is
piimt(aimt = 0) = ximt (ymt − fim) + imt(aimt = 0); (3.2)
while the profits of an airline i that decides to operate in market m at time t + 1,
piimt(aimt = 1), is
piimt(aimt = 1) = ximt (ymt − fim) − (1 − ximt)em + imt(aimt = 1). (3.3)
The interaction term between ximt and (ymt − fim) captures the notion that only
the incumbent airlines earn profits. Similarly, the interaction term between (1− ximt)
and eimt indicates that only new entrants pay entry costs.
The entry and exit decisions are dynamic, that is, they depend on expectations
about future competition. Upon entry, however, the competition is static. As dis-
cussed in Aguirregabiria and Ho (2012), capacity constraints and inter-temporal
price discrimination may generate dynamics in the pricing strategies of airlines.
However, this type of pricing dynamics is short-run and at the level of individual
flights. Therefore, we expect that these factors should play a very minor role in the
dynamics of competition and therefore the effect of RPE on the competition.
3.2.2 Manager’s Compensation and Utility
The CEO of airline i is subject to an exogenous representative compensation con-
tract. In other words, we do not derive the form of an optimal contract but instead
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approximate contracts observed, i.e., the representative contract is inferred from
data and may or may not be optimal.
The contract consists of two parts: a profit share and RPE, suggesting that the
CEO is rewarded not only on absolute performance but also on the basis of peer
performance. Formally, the contract is written as
uit = λopiit − λppi−it, (3.4)
where piit represents performance of airline i at time t, which is the aggregated
profits over markets, i.e., piit =
∑M
m=1 piimt. pi−it represents peer performance of airline







λo and λp are parameters representing the contract loadings on airline’s own and
peer performance respectively. The contract indicates that the CEO utility of airline
i increases with that airline’s own performance but decreases with peer performance.
After signing the contract, the CEO chooses a set of market entry-exit deci-
sions ait = {aimt : m = 1, 2, · · · ,M} to maximize the present value of his future
utility, taking into account the implications of his current choices on future profits
and on the future reactions of competitors. We assume that CEOs’ strategies de-
pend only on payoff-relevant state variables, that is, we assume a Markov perfect
equilibrium. An airline’s payoff-relevant information at time t is {xt, st, it}. Let
σ = {σi(xt, st, it) : i = 1, 2, · · · ,N} be a vector of strategy functions, one for each
airline. A Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) in this game is a vector of strategy
functions σ such that each airline’s strategy maximizes the utility of the airline’s
manager for each possible state (xt, st, it), taking as given other airlines’ strategies.
The Bellman equation for the problem is given by










It is extremely challenging to solve and estimate the dynamic game of com-
petition described above. This intractability arises because the equilibrium of this
dynamic game of competition, an MPE, is based on information covering the space
of all state variables (xt, st). For example, the dimension of the space xt, is 2NM, as
it contains all possible combinations of binary entry-exit decisions for all airlines
in all markets. Given the number of markets and airlines in our empirical analysis,
solving a dynamic game with this state space is not feasible.
To deal with this computational complexity, we therefore reduce the dimension
of state space by assuming that an airline’s entry-exit decisions are decentralized
to local managers. That is, every airline has M local managers, one for each mar-
ket. The local managers and the CEO have perfectly aligned interests. Each local
manager (i,m) chooses aimt ∈ (0, 1) to maximize the present value of his future
utility. Thus, the optimization problem in (3.4) and (3.5) can be decomposed and
represented as:










in which the one-period utility of the local manager (i,m) is
uimt = λopiimt − λpximtpi−imt. (3.7)







Note that at the market level, RPE enters the utility of a local manager under two
conditions. First, only local managers of incumbent airlines (ximt = 1) get evaluated
relative to their peers. Second, the market should have at least one incumbent airline
other than i, i.e., nmt > 1. Thus, the state space of the optimization problem of a
local manager is reduced to M × 2N .
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3.2.3 Effects of Relative Performance Evaluation
In this subsection, we discuss the two effects generated by the use of RPE. On the
one hand, a common view in the theoretical literature on optimal contracts is that
RPE can be used as a more efficient tool to incentivize CEO effort. This incentive
effect arises because comparisons between competing agents can serve as a device
to filter out common shocks and thus extract information about effort. On the other
hand, the use of RPE also provides incentives for CEOs to take actions that influence
peer performance. We term this second effect the competition effect. Because RPE
places a negative weight on peer performance, CEOs receive higher compensation
if peers perform worse.
We demonstrate these two effects by opening up an incumbent local manager’s
utility function, as only the manager of an incumbent airline get evaluated relative
to his peers.
uimt = λo(ymt − fim + (aimt)) − λp 1nmt − 1
∑
j,i
(ymt − f jm + (a jmt)).
Recall that incumbent airlines earn the same revenues ymt(smt, xmt) in market m at
time t but are heterogeneous in their fixed operating costs fim. We rewrite the utility
function as
uimt = (λo − λp)ymt − (λo − λp) fim + λp( f−im − fim).
The first component reflects the incentive effect discussed in the theoretical lit-
erature. The presence of RPE (λp > 0) reduces the weight on revenues ymt that
are outside of the manager’s control, making CEO compensation less sensitive to
exogenous market conditions. The last component demonstrates the competition ef-
fect. The use of RPE adds extra rewards to the local manager if he maintains lower
fixed operating costs (and thus higher profit margins) than the peer average. In other
words, RPE provides higher incentives to the manager who maintains lower fixed
operating costs to operate in the market.
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3.2.4 Policy Functions
In this section, we numerically examine policy functions implied by the model, in
order to explore the insights of the model. The policy function is a rule that provides
the best choice in the next period for any given combination of state variables in
the current period. Figure 3.2 Panel A plots equilibrium conditional probabilities
across airlines as a function of the total market size s, evaluated at the steady-state
distribution. The value of model parameters is taken from the set of estimation
results specified in Table 3.5. Overall, the probability of being active p(a = 1)
rises with the market size s. Intuitively, a strong market incentivizes managers
to operate in markets and earn profits. The response to market size differs across
heterogeneous airlines. Airlines with lower fixed operating costs, such as Delta
(DL) and Northwest (NW), behave more aggressively by being active in response
to market conditions as compared to the ones with higher fixed operating costs such
as Continental (CO) and American (AA). In Panel B of Figure 3.2, we show the
response of market participation using separate data across markets. Overall, the
policy functions show a similar pattern with those in Panel A. The only difference is
that the market participation incentive is decreasing in the oversized market, shown
as the downward sloping of the curves on the right end. This is because, in an overly
crowed segment market, the marginal benefit of being active is not able to offset the
marginal cost of increasing competition. This could be possible in the market like
the route between Chicago and New York, in which the market saturation is high.
We proceed by conducting a comparative statics exercise to further explore the
economic mechanism through which the use of relative performance evaluation af-
fects airlines’ entry-exit decisions. Specifically, we use the following two-step pro-
cedure. We first solve and simulate the model 21 times corresponding to 21 values
of λp in the range of [0, 0.5×10−3], while keeping the rest of parameters the same as
specified in Table 3.5. We then calculate the average of the equilibrium probabilities
over the simulated data that matches the real sample based on the steady state.
Figure 3.3 depicts the relation between the contract loading on peer performance
λp and the airline’s tendency to operate in a market under bad and good market con-
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ditions, respectively. Evidently, the use of RPE has an asymmetric effect on entry-
exit decisions depending on market conditions, smt. RPE decreases (increases) the
probability of being active under good (bad) market conditions. This asymmetric
effect occurs because RPE makes CEO compensation less sensitive to market con-
ditions. Managers, under RPE contracts, make entry-exit decisions while facing a
tradeoff between the reduction in compensation based on market conditions, and
the gain from being compared to competing agents. Specifically, under bad market
conditions, managers under RPE contracts benefit from being punished less for any
bad performance and therefore are reluctant to operate in the market. In contrast,
managers under RPE contracts lose out on the opportunity to free-ride on good
market conditions. Instead, they benefit more from being compared to similarly
well-performed peers and therefore are motivated to operate in the market.
The trade-off discussed above, and therefore the effect of RPE on entry-exit
decisions, naturally vary across heterogeneous airlines, depending on the airline’s
comparative advantage (i.e., fixed operating costs). Figure 3.4 depicts the asym-
metric effect of RPE for each airline under different market conditions. For airlines
with lower fixed operating costs, RPE tends to increase more (decrease less) the
probability of being active under good (bad) market conditions. That is, RPE pro-
vides higher incentives to airlines with lower fixed operating costs to operate in the
market. This incentive effect happens because RPE rewards managers that maintain
lower fixed operating costs (and thus higher profit margins) than the peer average.
3.3 Data
Our analysis relies on several sources: the Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B)
for airline entry and exit, ExecuComp for managerial compensation, and CRSP for
stock returns.
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3.3.1 Airline Entry and Exit
We construct the airline entry and exit data following Ciliberto and Tamer (2009)
by using the DB1B survey provided by the Bureau of Transportation Statistics. The
DB1B survey consists of a sample of 10% of all airline tickets from reporting car-
riers and classifies information at the coupon, market and tickets level separately.
The ticket data set contains the summary characteristics of each itinerary, including
reporting carrier, origin/destination, prorated airfare, etc. The market data set con-
tains the directional market characteristics of the air tickets. The coupon data set
contains the characteristics of each leg of the air tickets, such as operating carrier,
origin/destination airport, number of passengers, fare class, etc.
We start with a sample of data from the first quarter of 1993 to the last quarter
of 2015. Following Ciliberto and Tamer (2009), we take three steps to link all
information in DB1B. In the first step, we merge the DB1B coupon data set with
operating carrier information from the T-100 Domestic Segment Dataset and drop
the unmatched coupons. The T-100 Domestic Market (U.S. Carriers) data reports
all flights that occur in the United States in a given month of the year. In the second
step, we merge this reduced DB1B coupon data set with the DB1B ticket data set
by ticket identification numbers. Finally, we merge the cleaned ticket-coupon data
set with the DB1B market data set to get the information on origin and destination
airport.
In this process, we drop observations with following characteristics: (i) tickets
with more than six coupons; (ii) tickets whose fare credibility is questioned by the
Department of Transportation (variable dollarcred with value of 0); (iii) tickets that
are neither one-way nor round-trip travel; (iv) tickets including travel on more than
one airline on a directional trip (know as interline tickets); (v) tickets with a fare less
than 20 dollars; (vi) tickets involving U.S. non-reporting carriers flying within North
America (small airlines serving big airlines) and foreign carrier flying between two
U.S. points; (vii) tickets that are part of international travel; (viii) tickets involving
noncontiguous domestic travel (Hawaii, Alaska, and territories); (ix) tickets in the
top and bottom five percentiles of the year-quarter fare distribution.
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Markets We define a market as a trip between a pair of metropolitan statistical
areas (MSAs), irrespective of intermediate stops and of the direction of the flight.6
The sample includes markets between the top 50 MSAs ranked by the average pop-
ulation during the sample period from the U.S. Census Bureau. Table 3.1 presents
the list of the 50 MSAs and their population. The markets considered are sizable:
From 1993 to 2015, the top 50 MSAs cover on average 63.8% of the U.S. popula-
tion; the markets between these 50 MSAs serve more than 66.61% of all passengers
and generate more than 66.77% of all revenues over all reported market segments
in DB1B.
For each MSA, we cluster all the primary airports classified by the Federal Avi-
ation Administration, excluding the general aviation airports.7 By doing so, we im-
plicitly assume perfect substitution in demand and supply between two routes with
the same MSAs but different airports and cities. There exists M = (50 × 49)/2 =
1, 225 possible markets. Table 3.2 presents the top 20 markets ranked by the average
annual number of passengers served.
Airlines A ticket may involve more than one airline because of code shares.8 We
therefore use the reporting carrier at the ticket level in DB1B to identify the airline.9
By doing so, we assume that the reporting carrier pays the cost of operating the flight
and receives the revenue for providing this service.
We restrict our attention to the top airlines ranked by the annual number of pas-
sengers served for two reasons. First, we need comparable peers. Second, the state
space grows exponentially with the number of airlines studied, which is clearly pro-
hibitive with many airlines. For any N airlines, there are 2N possible combinations
of choice sets. To this end, we aggregate the regional affiliates to their holding
6Our definition is in line with the previous literature: Ciliberto and Tamer (2009) considers
airport-pairs and Aguirregabiria and Ho (2012) considers city-pairs.
7General aviation airports are civilian airports that do not serve scheduled passenger service.
These airports usually serve private aircraft and small aircraft charter operations.
8Approximately one third of tickets in our sample involve more than one airline.
9The reporting carrier is an airline that submits the ticket information to the Office of Airline
Information. According to the directives of the Bureau of Transportation Statistics (Number 224 of
the Accounting and Reporting Directives), the first operating carrier is responsible for submitting
the applicable survey data as reporting carrier.
56
parent airlines and drop the regional carriers whose core business is not in cooper-
ation with the major carriers. The process leaves us with 7 airline carriers in the
refined sample. Table 3.3 presents our list of 7 airlines together with the annual
number of passengers and the number of operating markets. Southwest is the air-
line that flies more passengers (about 2.5 million passengers in the 10% sample);
while American, United, and Delta follow in the ranking. These 7 carriers in total
served 80.49% passengers and generated 82.14% revenues in the markets between
top 50 MSAs during 1993-2008.
Mergers, Acquisitions and Code-Share Agreements The U.S. airline industry
has experienced substantial consolidation over the past few decades. A.4 lists the
recent airline mergers and code-share agreements in the US airline industry.
Merges and acquisitions (M&A) can be considered as extreme cases of entry-
exit decisions. Yet we do not explicitly model the M&A decisions in our dynamic
model for two reasons. Theoretically, M&A decisions are sufficiently rare that the
expectation of future mergers do not influence equilibrium play. Empirically, M&A
in the U.S. airline industry are heavily regulated. Many policy makers feared that
the commercial airline industry could become overly concentrated in the wake of the
Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 and the closure of the Civil Aeronautics Board in
1985. Therefore, mergers between airlines on the verge of collapse were approved
to maintain competition, while mergers between fiscally healthy airlines were gen-
erally prevented.
Nevertheless, the mergers and acquisitions have important implications for the
estimation of our dynamic game because they change the number of global players
defined in our dynamic game. To this end, instead of modeling the mergers and ac-
quisitions explicitly, we take into account the industry revolution by estimating our
dynamic game for the sample period 1993-2008. In this period, the global players
are Southwest, American, Delta, United, US Airways, Northwest and Continental.
A code-share agreement allows an airline to sell seats on a partner’s plane as
if they were its own. This would potentially affect our estimation depending on
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whether the code-shared routes are complementary or overlapping. On the one
hand, routes are complementary when together they allow travel between two cities
that is not possible on either airline. A code-share agreement effectively enables the
two airlines to enter a market jointly. The use of the reporting carrier has taken care
of these cases.
On the other hand, routes are overlapping when both airlines offered compet-
ing service in the same market prior to the code-share alliance. In this market, an
alliance could facilitate price collusion, which violates the model assumption of
the negative relation between the number of incumbents and profits. Nevertheless,
the concern of price collusion is alleviated in two ways. From a practical perspec-
tive, code-share agreements are subject to careful review by the U.S. Department
of Transportation, which ensures the agreements are not anti-competitive or ad-
verse to the public interest. From an academic perspective, Gayle (2007) uses a
structural framework to examine the competitive effects of the code-share alliances
among Continental, Delta, and Northwest in 2002, finding few significant departure
between collusive and pre-alliance prices.10
3.3.2 Executive Compensation
For the airlines we consider, we collect managerial compensation information from
ExecuComp and stock returns from CRSP. Note that ExecuComp covers only S&P
1500 firms starting from 1994. To supplement, we hand collect compensation in-
formation from SEC filings on EDGAR when missing.
Our final sample for estimation of the dynamic game consists of two annual-
frequency panels from 1993 to 2008: a panel of managerial compensation and stock
returns for 7 airlines and a panel of entry-exit data for 8,575 local managers (i.e., 7
airlines times 1,225 markets).
10Strategic alliances formed by code-sharing may have an impact on deterring potential competi-




Figure 3.1 presents the distribution of the 1,225 markets examined across the num-
ber of incumbent airlines over our sample period. 12 markets have never been
served by any of the airlines over the years. Approximately 75% of the markets
have more than three airlines operating, and one-third of the markets on average
have six incumbent airlines providing service. The average number of airlines op-
erating per market is 4.69, guaranteeing the existence of the comparable peers.11
The data contain interesting information regarding market dynamics. On the
one hand, the frequency of entry and exit per market is high. Among the 1,225 mar-
kets over the sample period, 81.39% (83.59%) of the markets have experienced at
least one entry (exit). This significant turnover provides us with enough variation to
identify the parameters of fixed and entry costs. On the other hand, the frequency of
entry and exit per market-year is low. Panel A of Table 3.4 presents the distribution
of market-year observations by the number of entrants and exits, respectively. Sim-
ilar to Aguirregabiria and Ho (2012), the average numbers of entrants and exits per
market-year are 0.13 and 0.18 respectively. These low frequencies suggest a high
barrier to entry.
There exists considerable heterogeneity across airlines. Panel B of Table 3.4
presents statistics describing the differences among airline operations. The first part
presents the number of “monopoly” markets across airlines over sample period.
Delta and US Airways are the largest monopoly carriers, serving 32% and 29%
of the monopoly markets, or on average 12 and 16 monopoly markets per year
respectively. Southwest, at 14%, is a distant second.
The second part shows the average conditional probabilities of staying in mar-
kets across airlines. The conditional probabilities are calculated using the following
two-step procedure. In the first step, we aggregate observations by state (x, s) de-
11Aguirregabiria and Ho (2012) reports the average number of airlines with non-stop flights per
market is only 1.4. We have a much larger number for two reasons. First, we define a market as the
trip between a pair of metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs), irrespective of intermediate stops and
of the direction of the flight. Second, we consider and therefore aggregate quarterly data into yearly
data.
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fined in the model for each player and calculate the sample frequency of airline
entry-exit decisions for each state-player pair. In the second step, we lump and
average the sample frequencies of states when xi = 1 for each airline i. This mea-
sure allows us to capture heterogeneous airline characteristics while controlling for
market size, the level of competition, and the heterogeneity of peers which are im-
portant determinants of firm survival. Delta, with 87%, has the highest probability
of staying in a market once it has entered; while Continental, with 68%, has the
lowest probability of staying.
3.4 Estimation
This section describes our approach to estimating the parameters of our model.
Because it would be too computationally burdensome to estimate all parameters si-
multaneously, we use a two-step strategy. We first estimate the process describing
the dynamics of market size by formulating the process as a discrete Markov chain
and estimating the transition probabilities. We then estimate the rest of parame-
ters using the dynamic game of competition. For all estimations, the real risk-free
interest rate, r, is set to 0.97% (i.e., an annual discount factor of 0.99) to match
the average difference between three-month T-bill rate and the growth rate of the
Consumer Price Index over our sample period.
3.4.1 Market Size
Recall that we assume that the size smt of market m evolves exogenously according
to a Markov process. Our approach deviates from, for example, Aguirregabiria and
Ho (2012), who model variable profits as the outcome of equilibrium price compe-
tition and estimate the resulting demand system using a nested logit model. We opt
for our simpler approach because it provides us with the tractability to focus on the
effects of compensation contracts on the dynamics of the competition. In this sub-
section, we discretize the continuous-valued market size using the approximation
method proposed by Rouwenhorst (1995), where we choose this method because
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of the results in Kopecky and Suen (2010) and Galindev and Lkhagvasuren (2010)
that this method is more accurate than other alternatives when persistence is high.
Estimating the market size presents a challenging task because of heterogeneity
in local economies, airport network structures, and consumer preferences. How-
ever, the number of passengers served provides a useful measure of market size if
we assume that realized demand is an equilibrium outcome of competition. In our
own data, we face a further problem with this measure because we occasionally
observe no passengers in a market. For these cases, our assumption of an equilib-
rium outcome implies that we conclude that there is no demand in the market. We
overcome this problem by replacing zeros with imputed values from the following
regression:
ln(Passengermt) = β0 + β1 ln(Populationmt) + β2 ln(Income Per Capitamt)
+ β3Income Growthmt + β4m + β5t + mt,
(3.8)
where Passengermt stands for the number of passengers carried in market m at time t.
We include three demographic variables: Populationmt is the sum of the metropoli-
tan populations, Income Per Capitamt is the average of the metropolitan personal in-
come per capita, and Income Growthmt is the average rates of income growth, which
we use to measure the strength of the local economy. In addition, we include mar-
ket fixed effects, β4m, that capture between-market differences such as geographic
location, which are constant over time. We also include year fixed effects, β5t, to
account for year-specific differences that are common for all markets, for example,
the impact of September 11, 2001.
We obtain the data on personal income per capita for metropolitan areas from the
Regional Economic Accounts of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Unfor-
tunately, the BEA provides estimates of GDP for metropolitan areas starting only in
2001. We therefore use the income growth to capture the strength of the economies.
We proceed to discretize market size and estimate its transition probability. As
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standard, we assume that market size follows an AR(1) process with drift in logs:
ln(sm,t+1) = µ + ρ ln(smt) + σωm,t+1, (3.9)
where µ and ρ are the drift and the autoregressive coefficient respectively, and ω is
a standard normal i.i.d. innovation. We obtain values of the drift, persistence and
volatility of the market size by directly estimating the AR(1) regression. We then
use the method in Rouwenhorst (1995) to discretize this AR(1) process and obtain
the transition matrix of the discretized variable with 5 points of support. As shown
in Kopecky and Suen (2010) the Rouwenhorst method is able to produce highly
accurate approximations even when N = 5.
3.4.2 Estimation of the Dynamic Game
The estimation of the dynamic game is based on a representation of Markov perfect
equilibria as fixed points of a best response mapping in the space of players’ choice
probabilities. We interpret these choice probabilities as players’ beliefs about the
behavior of their opponents. Given these beliefs, each player’s problem can be
interpreted as a game against nature with a unique optimal decision rule – the play-
ers’s best response – in probability space.12 The best response mapping is always a
unique function of structural parameters and players’ beliefs about the behavior of
other players.
To estimate our dynamic game, we assume that the data have been generated by
only one Markov perfect equilibrium. Thus even if the model has multiple equi-
libria, we do not need to specify an equilibrium selection mechanism because the
equilibrium that has been selected will be identified from the conditional choice
probabilities in the data.13
12In this paper we consider only pure-strategy equilibria because, according to Harsanyi (1973),
they are observationally equivalent to mixed-strategy equilibria. Harsanyi’s “purification theorem”
established that a mixed-strategy equilibrium in a game of complete information can be interpreted as
a pure-strategy equilibrium of a game of incomplete information. That is, the probability distribution
of players’ actions is the same under the two equilibria.
13See Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007) for a detailed discussion.
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Estimator Since the model implies a probability distribution over the possible
outcomes, a natural starting point is to construct a nested maximum-likelihood al-
gorithm that, in each iteration, solves the fixed-point problem given the current
estimate of the parameter values. However, such maximum likelihood estimators
are limited to serve our application because of the following identification problem.
Recall the parametric specification of the utility function (3.7), where the sets of
contract- and profit-related parameters enter in a multiplicative form. As maximum
likelihood estimation would only utilize market-level entry-exit data, the estima-
tors would not contain enough information to disentangle and therefore separately
identify these parameters.
To overcome this identification problem, we use the two-step of moments esti-
mator in the spirit of Rust (1994). In the first step, the computation of a fixed point
problem delivers the equilibrium choice probabilities for a given set of parameter
values. In the second step, the parameters of interest are inferred by fitting a set of
moments that match the equilibrium choice probabilities and value function in the
model with their data analogs.14 This approach overcomes the aforementioned iden-
tification problem by allowing for the incorporation of airline-level compensation
data that facilitates the identification of contract-related parameters in the model.
Specifically, let θ denote the vector of parameters to be estimated. The procedure
follows two steps:
Step 1: solve a fixed point problem to obtain the conditional choice probabil-
ities p:
p(θ) = Ψ(p(θ)),
where Ψ denotes the policy interaction operator;
14Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008) show that structural estimators for dynamic models
proposed by Rust (1994), Hotz and Miller (1993), and Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002) are asymp-
totic least squares estimators defined by a set of equilibrium conditions. The estimators differ in the
weights they assign to individual equilibrium conditions.
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Step 2: solve a least square problem to obtain the estimates of parameters:
θ = arg min
θ
g(θ)′Wg(θ),
where W denotes the weight matrix, and g(θ) is the vector of moment differ-
ences between the data and the model equilibrium. The moment estimators
are selected to make the actual and model moments as close to each other as
possible.
Identification We need to estimate 12 parameters θ = (γs, γn, fi, e, λe, λp)′ by
matching moments predicted by the model to their analogs in the data. The mo-
ments we use consist of two sets: (1) OLS regression coefficients from the airline-
level compensation data, and (2) state-specific entry probabilities from the market-
level entry-exit data. The moments are selected to identify our structural parameter
vector θ.
The contract-related parameters, i.e., the loading on CEO compensation for the
firm’s own and peer performance are identified using the airline-level compensation
data. Specifically, we use as moments the coefficients from the following regres-
sion:
uit = λˆ1 + λˆopiit + λˆppi−it + it, (3.10)
where piit and pi−it denote separately the profits (Compustat item NI) of airline i and
its peers −i at time t, where peer performance is measured as the value-weighted
average profits of all airlines other than airline i. We let uit denote CEO compensa-
tion (ExecuComp item TDC1), adjusting for the other compensation (ExecuComp
item OTHCOMP), of airline i at time t. We use this adjustment because focusing on
total CEO compensation (ExecuComp item TDC1), an approach used in previous
studies, can underestimate the extent to which total executive pay is correlated with
performance. Other compensation received by the CEO (ExecuComp item OTH-
COMP), such as severance payments and signing bonuses, is largely unrelated to
the performance of the firm during the executive’s tenure.
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In the airline industry, the leading roles are long-tenured, CEOs can switch
CEOs switch companies within the industry. For example, there are two cases in
which the same person served as CEO for different airlines during the sample pe-
riod.15 To this end, we include CEO times airline fixed-effects to control for CEO-
airline matches. The procedure gives λˆo = 1.356 × 10−3, and λˆp = −0.196 × 10−3.
Note that the coefficients λˆo and λˆp do not correspond directly to the contract-
related parameters in the model because the airline-level compensation data omits
information at the market level. Thus, the regression is not able to capture a given
airline’s heterogeneity, such as the operating status, across markets. Nevertheless,
the regression coefficients are useful moments with which to identify contract-
related parameters. Importantly, as we hold these contract-related moments fixed
across markets for a given airline and then solve for profit-related parameters, het-
erogeneity across markets is therefore attributed to profit-related parameters, such
as entry costs and fixed operating costs. This approach reinforces our model as-
sumption that local managers are subject to the same contract as the CEO.
The profit-related parameters are then identified using the market-level entry-
exit data. Recall that the game has a Markov structure, that is, if {xk, sk} = {xl, sl},
then airline i’s decisions at periods k and l are the same. In order to calculate the
probability distribution of the Markov structure, we aggregate observations by state
for each player and calculate the sample frequency of airline entry-exit decisions for
each state-player pair. Specifically, let p(ai|x, s) denote the probability that airline i




t 1(ait = 1, x = xt, s = st)∑
t 1(x = xt, s = st)
.
As a result, the total number of N × M × 2N sample frequencies are obtained as
moments that are used to match the equilibrium choice probabilities p from the
model. The number N × M × 2N comes from multiplying the number of players N
15Stephen M. Wolf served as CEO of United from December 1987 to July 1994 and later as
CEO of US Airways from January 1996 to November 1998. Richard H. Anderson served as CEO
of Northwest from April 2001 to October 2004 and later on CEO of Delta from September 2007 to
May 2016.
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and the number of states M × 2N . The number of states is all possible combinations
of market size M and the choices of the players 2N .
We use variation in the choice probability across players and states to identify
separately the profit-related parameters for each CEO contract. The revenue-related
parameters γs and γn are identified through variation in choice probabilities in re-
sponse to the market size and the number of incumbents. The vector of airline-
specific fixed operating costs f , capturing market × airline fixed effects, is identified
through variation in the probability of being active among incumbents. The entry
cost e is identified from the differences in the probability of being active between
incumbents and potential entrants.
We construct the weight matrix to match the two sets of moments described
above. The weight matrix for the compensation regression coefficients is an iden-
tity matrix. The weight matrix for the state-specific entry probabilities is a diagonal
matrix with elements equal to the frequency that the data visited per state. This
choice implies that we assign the most weight to the state-specific entry probabil-
ities that are observed most frequently. We then combine the two weight matrices
by constructing a block diagonal matrix. Note that the compensation moments are
small in magnitude compared to the state-specific entry probabilities. As such, a
simple combination of the two weight matrices implicitly undermines the impor-
tance of the compensation moments. To compensate, we therefore multiply the
identity weight matrix of the compensation regression coefficients by 104.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Results Using Pooled Data Across Markets
We start by presenting our estimation results of the dynamic game using data pooled
across markets. We observe 1,225 markets over 16 years which gives 18,375 (=
1, 225 × 15) observed state-action profiles. By pooling data across markets, we im-
plicitly assume that the observed state-action profiles are generated from an identi-
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cal data generating process in all markets and, more importantly, a single and iden-
tical equilibrium of the game is played across all markets.16 Therefore, we need
to deal with unobserved market heterogeneity in order to apply the pooled data as-
sumption. To this end, we obtain the persistence and volatility of average market
size using data that have undergone a within-transformation and calculate the drift
as the average of cross section’s mean. The procedure gives µ = 8.191, ρ = 0.892,
and σ = 0.090. Accordingly, a representative market of the median size has 3,608
passengers.
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3.5 present our estimation results. All of parameter
estimates are significantly different from zero, including the estimate of the loading
on peer firm performance for CEO compensation. This evidence provides a strong
support to the existence of peer performance evaluation.
The first panel of Table 3.5 contains the point estimates and standard errors for
the profit-related parameters.Our estimate of γs = 0.04 indicates that variable profits
per airline increase significantly with market size, in dollar terms by $40 per pas-
senger. Given that on average each market has four operating airlines, the estimated
γs implies a variable profit of $160 per airfare. The estimated value also implies
a variable profit of $144.05 thousand for a monopolist in a market of median size.
Competition intensity, measured by the logarithm of the number of incumbents,
also has a significant effect on variable profits. The estimated value of γn suggests a
$1.90 thousand or 1.32% reduction in variable profits per airline when we go from
a monopoly to a duopoly in a market of median size.
The average estimated fixed cost is $97.46 thousand, ranging from $88.41 thou-
sand for Delta to $104.64 thousand for Continental. It represents 68% of variable
profit for a monopolist in a market of median size. These ratios are consistent with
the statistics provided by the Air Transport Association of America, who reports
16Otsu, Pesendorfer and Takahashi (2016) propose several statistical tests to examine whether
data from distinct markets can be pooled for finite state Markov games. The paper summarizes a few
reasons for a violation of the data pooling assumption: (i) multiple equilibria are played across mar-
kets; (ii) the game form describing players’ behavior and interactions differs across markets; and (iii)
the specified model is not sufficiently rich as it does not control for all observable or unobservable
market-level heterogeneity adequately.
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that the average fixed operating costs amount to 71.2% of total operating expenses
and 67.2% of revenue in 1993-1998. These results are also comparable to those
reported in Aguirregabiria and Ho (2012), who find 75% using the variable profits
attributable only to nonstop flights as the denominator. This high value of the ratio
between fixed costs and variable profits implies substantial economies of scale in
the airline industry. In addition, the rank of the estimated fixed costs among airlines
is in line with Ciliberto and Tamer (2009), who show that fixed operating costs are
low for Delta and high for United.
The average estimated entry cost is $8,869.82 thousand, a figure that represents
91 times the average estimated fixed cost, and 62 times variable profit for a monop-
olist in a market of median size. This implied entry cost is much higher than the
one estimated by Aguirregabiria and Ho (2012). The reason lies our pooling of data
across markets. Recall that the absence of observed market entry can be attributed
to two reasons. Either the market size is small and therefore has not enough demand
or the airlines face substantial entry costs. The procedure of our market discretiza-
tion naturally results in an inflation of small markets, leading to the overshooting of
the implied entry costs. The model’s tendency to overshoot the entry cost suggests
the need to consider market heterogeneity.
The second panel of Table 3.5 presents the point estimates and standard errors of
the contract-related parameters. The compensation loading on peer performance is
2.09 × 10−4, suggesting a $209 compensation reduction corresponding to a million
dollar increase in the peer group.
Using the estimated model, we simulate data and obtain statistics that describe
market structure. Table 3.6 compares simulated and actual values of the statistics.
To obtain simulated data comparable to our real sample, we generate 1,225 markets
over 15 periods. We start by finding the steady-state distribution of the state using
the equilibrium choice probabilities and the transition probabilities for market size.
The initial state values for each market (smt, xmt) are subsequently randomly drawn
from the steady-state distribution of these variables. The entry-exit decision aimt is
calculated for a given state from the equilibrium choice probabilities. As the last
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step, we average these simulated values of aimt over the simulations and over the
sample.
Overall, the estimated model performs reasonably well. However, there are
some biases in the predictions. First, the model over-predicts the proportion of
markets with one incumbent by 13.0%, and under-predicts the proportion of mar-
kets with six incumbents by 15.2%. Second, the model under-predicts the amount
of market turnover. As discussed above, this result is the consequence of pooling
data across markets and therefore omitting market heterogeneity. The procedure of
our market discretization naturally results in an inflation of extremely small markets
and deflation of extremely large markets, which allows more markets with one in-
cumbent and less markets with six incumbents. Also, the moderation of the market
size reduces the probability that airlines drop out of the markets.
3.5.2 Results Using Separate Data Across Markets
The results above mask the substantial heterogeneity across markets. Specifically,
different markets, defined as non-directional pairs of MSAs, differ in market size,
entry costs, and airline-specific operating costs. More importantly, different markets
might differ in the equilibrium played. To address this issue, we divide markets
into 120 groups with similar size and estimate the dynamic game for each market
subgroup. We use subgroups because of data limitations. Although it would be
ideal to capture market heterogeneity by estimating the dynamic game by markets,
in any individual market, we only observe a sequence of state-action profiles over
15 periods. This limitation means we have 105 (15 × 7) observations to identify
12 parameters, which weakens statistical power. Each of the 120 market subgroups
pools data across 10 markets on average. The data aggregation is affirmed by the
homogeneity test proposed by Otsu, Pesendorfer and Takahashi (2016), which is
used to assess whether data from distinct markets can be pooled. Details regarding
the homogeneity test are in A.5.
We make two modifications to the estimation procedure described previously.
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The first modification concerns the profit-related moments. Because the sample
size becomes much smaller, the relative frequencies of entry and exit calculated
from the data are discrete in nature. To improve matching quality, we discretize
the conditional choice probabilities from the model based on the frequency of ob-
served states. The discretized conditional choice probabilities are then used in the
econometric objective function, whose goal is to minimize the distance between the
model and data moments.
The second modification relates to compensation-related moments. Note that
the observed compensation moments are at the aggregate level over markets, corre-
sponding to average contract loadings. When conducting estimation at the market
level, the model generated compensation moments vary depending on the market
size and observed entry-exit decisions. Therefore, we adjust the compensation-
moment weights used in estimation for each market based on the distribution of
market size that captures the market heterogeneity. We assign the most weights if
the market size is closest to the sample median.
We aggregate the parameter estimates across market groups by calculating weighted
averages. The weights are the same as those used for the compensation moments.
This procedure gives µ = 7.716, suggesting a representative market of median size
has 2,244 passengers.
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 3.5 present the estimation results using data from
separate markets. Similar to the pooled results, almost all of parameter estimates
(except γn) are significantly different from zero. Yet, the estimated entry cost is
more economically plausible. At $2,424.33 thousand, it exceeds the average esti-
mated fixed cost by a factor of 19. This piece of evidence confirms the importance
of taking into account market heterogeneity. We also find a higher compensation
loading on peer performance. However, this difference is accompanied by an almost
identical increase in the compensation loading on the airline’s own performance.
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3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we investigate how and to what extent the use of RPE affects industry
competition. Towards this end, we develop a dynamic game of competition with
heterogeneous firms in an oligopoly market with the presence of RPE contracts.
Using this framework, we obtain two main findings. First, the use of RPE has
an asymmetric effect on entry-exit decisions depending on market conditions: it
decreases the probability of being active in bad market conditions but increases the
probability of being active in good market conditions. Second, this effect is stronger
for firms with lower fixed operating costs.
The model also provides insights into the economic rationale behind these find-
ings. Because RPE makes CEO compensation less sensitive to market conditions,
managers, under RPE contracts, make entry-exit decisions while facing a tradeoff
between the lower sensitivity to market conditions, and the gain from being com-
pared to competing agents. Therefore, the effects of RPE on CEO incentives for
strategic competition depend not only on market conditions but also on the firm’s
comparative advantage relative to its peers.
We estimate the model using data from the U.S. airline industry with informa-
tion on entry and exit decisions for seven major airlines in the markets between the
50 largest MSAs. The estimated model is able to match key features of the mar-
ket structure and dynamics. The estimation results confirm the existence of peer
performance evaluation.
One direction for future research is based on our assumption of modeling ob-
served instead of optimal contracts. We do not characterize an optimal contract, so
the contract loadings on firms’ own and peer performance are exogenous and fixed.
While the rationale for this choice is based on the natural assumption of an incom-
plete contracting environment, we cannot ascertain whether the unintended effects
on industry competition induced by the use of RPE is optimal. Finding an answer
to this question is an interesting topic for future research.
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This figure presents the distribution of the 1,225 markets examined across the num-
ber of incumbent airlines between 1993 and 2007.
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Figure 3.2. Policy Functions












































This figure depicts the equilibrium conditional probabilities across airlines as a function of market
size, s, evaluated at the steady-state distribution. Model parameter values are taken from the set
of estimation results specified in Table 3.5. Panel A uses the estimates from pooled data across
markets, and Panel B uses the estimates from separate data across markets. The airlines considered
are American(AA), Continental(CO), Delta(DL), Northwest(NW), United(UA), US Airways(US)
and Southwest(WN).
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Figure 3.3. Relative Performance Evaluation and Market Conditions
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This figure depicts the relation between the contract loading on peer performance
λp and the airline’s tendency to operate in a market under bad and good market
conditions respectively.
74
Figure 3.4. Relative Performance Evaluation and Airline Heterogeneity
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This figure depicts the relation between the contract loading on peer performance
λp and the airline’s tendency to operate in a market across airlines. The first panel
depicts the probabilities of airlines operating in a market under bad market condi-
tions, and the second panel depicts the probabilities of airlines operating in a market
under good market conditions.
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Table 3.1. MSA and Population
The table presents the list of top 50 metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) ranked by
the average annual population between 1993 and 2008 from the US Census Bureau.
CBSA MSA, State Population
35620 New York-Newark-Jersey City, NY-NJ-PA 18,306,651
31080 Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim, CA 11,751,734
16980 Chicago-Naperville-Elgin, IL-IN-WI 9,004,264
14460 Boston-Cambridge-Newton, MA-NH 6,175,536
37980 Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD 5,680,094
19100 Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX 5,195,236




26420 Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX 4,789,770
19820 Detroit-Warren-Dearborn, MI 4,456,654
12060 Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA 4,263,447
41860 San Francisco-Oakland-Hayward, CA 4,057,384
40140 Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA 3,409,758
38060 Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ 3,317,283
42660 Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA 3,029,570
33460 Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI 2,957,210
41740 San Diego-Carlsbad, CA 2,825,013
76
Table 1. (Continued) MSA and Population
CBSA MSA, State Population
41180 St. Louis, MO-IL 2,668,021
12580 Baltimore-Columbia-Towson, MD 2,557,779
45300 Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL 2,413,157
38300 Pittsburgh, PA 2,380,470
39300 Providence-Warwick, RI-MA 2,164,859
19740 Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO 2,130,799
17460 Cleveland-Elyria, OH 2,125,131
17140 Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN 2,014,202
38900 Portland-Vancouver-Hillsboro, OR-WA 1,926,834
40900 Sacramento–Roseville–Arden-Arcade, CA 1,840,168
28140 Kansas City, MO-KS 1,832,935
41700 San Antonio-New Braunfels, TX 1,694,097
41940 San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA 1,681,379
36740 Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL 1,677,544
25540 Hartford-West Hartford-East Hartford, CT 1,612,177
47260 Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News, VA-NC 1,595,074
18140 Columbus, OH 1,587,790
26900 Indianapolis-Carmel-Anderson, IN 1,565,532
33340 Milwaukee-Waukesha-West Allis, WI 1,499,327
16740 Charlotte-Concord-Gastonia, NC-SC 1,420,926
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Table 1. (Continued) MSA and Population
CBSA MSA, State Population
29820 Las Vegas-Henderson-Paradise, NV 1,382,835
34980 Nashville-Davidson–Murfreesboro–Franklin, TN 1,289,531
35380 New Orleans-Metairie, LA 1,268,270
12420 Austin-Round Rock, TX 1,264,960
14860 Bridgeport-Stamford-Norwalk, CT 1,228,752
32820 Memphis, TN-MS-AR 1,173,752
35300 New Haven-Milford, CT 1,165,669
15380 Buffalo-Cheektowaga-Niagara Falls, NY 1,156,330
27260 Jacksonville, FL 1,128,611
31140 Louisville/Jefferson County, KY-IN 1,109,337
49340 Worcester, MA-CT 1,096,765
36420 Oklahoma City, OK 1,065,238
40060 Richmond, VA 1,060,857
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Table 3.2. Market and Number of Passengers in DB1B
The table presents the top 20 markets ranked by the average annual number of


















































































































Table 3.3. Airline by the Numbers of Passengers and Markets
The table presents the list of 7 airlines together with the annual number of passen-
gers and the number of operating markets served. The sample is based on DB1B
and covers the period from 1993 to 2008.
Code Airline Passenger No. Market No.
WN Southwest 2,445,857 637
AA American 2,107,029 1,064
UA United 1,971,053 1,059
DL Delta 1,843,527 1,119
US US Airways 1,472,839 1,116
CO Continental 1,282,698 1,139
NW Northwest 1,236,952 998
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Table 3.4. Market Structure and Dynamics
The table presents summary statistics of market structure and dynamics. The sam-
ple is based on DB1B and covers the period from 1993 to 2008. Panel A presents
the distribution of market-year observations by the number of entrants and exits,
respectively. Panel B presents statistics describing the differences of airline opera-
tions.
Panel A: Distribution of markets by number of entrants and exits
0 1 2 >=3
Entrants 87.69% 11.27% 1.00% 0.04%
Exits 84.46% 13.66% 1.75% 0.14%
Panel B: Heterogeneity across airlines




3 2 12 3 3 16 5
Market % 7% 5% 32% 8% 5% 29% 14%
Probability of staying in the industry
75% 68% 87% 80% 70% 75% 79%
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Table 3.5. Structural Parameter Estimates
The table reports the parameter estimates with their corresponding standard errors
in parentheses. The estimation is done with the two-step moments estimator in the
spirit of Rust (1994). In the first step, a fixed point problem computes the equilib-
rium choice probabilities for a given set of parameter values. In the second step, the
parameters of interest are inferred by fitting a set of moments that characterize the
equilibrium choice probabilities and value functions in the model to the data. The
data sample is constructed based on the DB1B survey and ExecuComp and covers
7 airlines over 1,225 markets from 1993 to 2008. γs and γn capture the impacts of
demand and competition respectively. f stands for the fixed operating costs that are
airline-specific. e stands for the entry costs. λo and λp are parameters representing
the contract loadings on airline’s own and peer performance respectively. We con-
sider two versions of the model estimation: Pooled corresponds to the results using




Estimates Std. Errors Estimates Std. Errors
Profit (in thousands)
Variable Profits
γs 0.04 (0.00) 0.05 (0.00)
γn 2.74 (0.24) 24.95 (16.27)
Fixed Costs
f(AA) 97.73 (2.52) 130.61 (21.16)
f(CO) 104.64 (2.54) 145.43 (21.22)
f(DL) 88.41 (2.51) 101.28 (20.98)
f(NW) 95.76 (2.52) 115.42 (21.13)
f(UA) 92.84 (2.52) 117.00 (21.23)
f(US) 103.23 (2.53) 141.34 (21.39)
f(WN) 99.64 (2.50) 151.77 (21.29)
Entry Costs
e 8,869.82 (0.20) 2,424.33 (12.08)
Compensation (×103)
λo 1.96 (0.00) 3.09 (0.03)
λp 0.21 (0.02) 0.30 (0.09)
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Table 3.6. Data and Model Predicted Statistics of Market Structure
This table compares simulated and actual statistics that describe market structure.
We consider two versions of the model estimation: Pooled corresponds to the results
using pooled data across markets and Separated corresponds to the results using
separated data across markets.
Data Model
Pooled Separated
Distribution of markets by number of incumbents
0 7.9% 12.6% 13.8%
1 3.6% 16.6% 8.9%
2 5.0% 9.4% 6.5%
3 7.1% 7.7% 10.7%
4 9.3% 8.9% 16.0%
5 17.5% 13.3% 21.8%
6 35.5% 20.4% 17.9%
7 14.1% 11.1% 4.3%
Distribution of markets by number of new entrants
0 87.69% 97.48% 97.79%
1 11.27% 2.25% 2.13%
2 1.00% 0.26% 0.08%
>= 3 0.04% 0.02% 0.01%
Distribution of markets by number of new exits
0 84.46% 92.29% 62.92%
1 13.66% 6.90% 25.58%
2 1.75% 0.77% 8.85%




In this thesis, I examine two important aspects of corporate governance and their ef-
fect on firm performance. In my first study, I empirically test if friendly boards ben-
efit the firm. Using data on individual political donations, we construct measures of
individual political orientation and political similarity between CEO and indepen-
dent directors. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that the political similarity
between CEO and independent directors significantly correlates with lower crash
risk in firm’s stock price. In addition, the insider trading by independent directors is
more informative if the political similarity between CEO and independent directors
is high. The effect of political similarity is more pronounced when the corporate
governance mechanisms are stronger, suggesting that the effect is mostly driven by
the need of independent directors to acquire information from CEO. Overall, the re-
sults show strong support to the argument that friendly boards facilitate information
sharing between CEO and independent directors thus benefit the firm.
In the second study, we develop and empirically estimate a dynamic game of
competition with heterogenous firms in an oligopoly market to examine the effect of
Relative Performance Evaluation (RPE) on firm performance. The model suggests
that the use of RPE has asymmetric effect on firm strategy depending on market
conditions: the use of RPE encourages firm to take more competition in good mar-
ket condition, but discourages firm to take competition when the market condition
is bad. Furthermore, using data in U.S. airline industry, we estimate the model to
match the key features of the market structure and dynamics. The estimation results
help explain why the evidence of RPE in practice is largely mixed.
In future studies, optimal board structure would be highly valuable to be exam-
ined. We do find friendly boards benefit the firm in certain aspect. However, it
is still remain an open question that what would be the optimal structure of inde-
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pendent directors for different firms. Furthermore, although endogenous optimal
contracting would unnecessarily complicates the model, it would be rewarding to
examine in broader picture. The model developed in the second study of this thesis
may be still useful when considering endogenous optimal contract.
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Appendix
A.1 Robust Measures of PHI
The different measures of individual political orientation may affect the baseline
results of crash risks significantly. In this section, we report various robust measures
of individual political orientation following as which in Lee, Lee and Nagarajan
(2014). Basically, the robust measures of individual political orientation adopt the
alternative assumption that the political orientation of individual does not vary (or
change gradually) over time. We define the following variables:
• Ri: Total dollar amount of political contribution made to Republican candi-
dates by individual i over all election cycles from 1989 to 2010;
• Di: Total dollar amount of political contribution made to Democratic candi-
dates by individual i over all election cycles from 1989 to 2010;
• Rti: Total dollar amount of political contribution made to Republican candi-
dates by individual i since 1989 to the end of year t;
• Dti: Total dollar amount of political contribution made to Democratic candi-
dates by individual i since 1989 to the end of year t;
Using these variables we construct the following individual Republican indices:
• Repi = Ri−DiRi+Di , the time invariant individual political orientation measure;
• Rep(strong)i =

Repi, if |Ri − Di| ≥ $2000
0, otherwise
, it is possible that individuals
who always donate evenly to both parties are making opportunistic investment
rather than revealing their true political orientation. Rep(strong)i minimize
the noise from opportunistic donators;
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, which measures individual political orientation using her total
contribution from 1989 to year t. This measure assumes that the individual
political orientation may change over time, but only change gradually;
Using above three measures of individual political orientation to replace RepCEOit
and RepIDit in equation 2.2, we achieve three alternative PHI measures, namely
PHI(individual), PHI(strong), and PHI(prior). In addition, we drop all individuals
with less than $2000 in total political contributions in measure PHI(individual) as




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































A.2 Robustness Test for Political Involvement
The table reports the results of the robustness test for political involvement of the firms in our base-
line regression. We measure the political involvement of the firm using whether it has an established
corporate political action committee (Corporate PAC). The Corporate PAC is a dummy variable
takes value of 1 (0) if the firm has (not) a registered Corporate PAC, which indicating the political
involvement of the firm is high (low). In all regressions, we control for Board Size, 1-year lagged
ROA and Investment, R&D, log(Assets), Market Leverage, and CEO-Director Connection Strength.
In Column 2 and 4, we further include the weakPHIdummy to control for the cases when both the
CEO and independent directors made no contribution. We include firm fixed effects and year fixed
effects in all the regressions. The standard errors are clustered at the firm level in all columns. The
t-statistics for each estimated coefficient are reported in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ ∗ ∗ denote the
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
NCSKEW Duvol
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PHI -0.0146** -0.0235** -0.0176* -0.0299**
(-2.01) (-2.24) (-1.80) (-2.14)
PHI × Corporate PAC -0.0013 -0.0009
(-0.59) (-0.46)
Weak PHI Dummy 0.00571 0.00689
(1.34) (1.27)
N 10986 10986 11796 11796
Adj R-square 0.001 0.019 -0.000 -0.000
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
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A.3 IV Regression for Big Firms
The table reports the 2SLS regression results for big firms. In this sample, we only include the firms
with size in the top quartile in our sample. In Column 1, the first-stage regression result is reported.
In Columns 2, 3, and 4, the second-stage regression results for the change in negative coefficient
skewness, change in down-to-up volatility, and the change in Q are reported respectively. The control
variables in all columns are Board Size, one year lagged ROA, one year lagged investment, Market
Leverage, R&D, log(Assets), and CEO-Directors Connection Strength. The standard errors are
clustered within firm level. The t-statistics for each estimated coefficient are reported in parentheses.
∗, ∗∗, and ∗ ∗ ∗ denote the statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
First-Stage Second-Stage
∆PHI ∆NCSKEW ∆DUVOL ∆Q
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆Local PHI × Safe State Dummy 0.0712*
(1.82)




∆PHI (2SLS IV) -0.088** -0.115** -0.0159
(-2.30) (-2.02) (-0.81)
F-statistic 16.911
J-statistic (p − value) 0.77 0.75 0.77
Number of Observations 1137 1137 1137 1137
Adj R-square 0.255 -0.091 -0.101 0.124
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
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A.4 US Airline Industry Evolution
Table A.3. US Airline Mergers, Acquisitions and Code-Share Agreements
Panel A: Mergers and Acquisitions
1993 Southwest (WN) acquires Morris Air
1997 ValuJet merges with AirWays Corp., and becomes AirTran (FL)
1999 American (AA) acquires Reno Airways (QX)
2001 American (AA) acquires Trans World Airlines
2005 US Airways (US) merges with America West (HP)
2008 Delta (DL) merges with Northwest (NW)
2010 United (UA) merges with Continental (CO)
2011 Southwest (WN) merges with AirTran (FL)
2013 American (AA) merges with US Airways (US)
Panel B: Code-Share Agreements
1998 American (AA) and Alaska (AS)
1998 Northwest (NW) and Continental (CO)
1999 Continental (CO) and Alaska (AS)
1999 Northwest (NW) and Alaska (AS)
2003 United (UA) and US Airways (US)
2003 Northwest (NW), Continental (CO) and Delta (DL)
2005 Delta (DL) and Alaska (AS)
Source: Mountford (2003); Ito and Lee (2007); Mills (2010)
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A.5 Test of Pooling Data Across Markets
In this section, we give a brief outline of the homogeneity test for assessing whether
data from distinct markets can be pooled. The test draws from Otsu, Pesendorfer
and Takahashi (2016) and is adapted to our setting.
The test directly compares the set of conditional choice probabilities estimated
from the pooled sample with those estimated from individual markets. It builds
on the idea that under the null hypothesis, the observed state-action profiles are
generated from an identical data generating process and the same equilibrium was
played in all markets. This null hypothesis is then a maintained assumption for
estimation based on pooled data.








pˆ j(d) − pˆ(d)
]2
,
where for each state-action profile, d = (a|x, s), pˆ j(d) and pˆ(d) denote the condi-
tional choice probabilities for a market j and pooled markets respectively. W j(d)
is a weight or standardization for obtaining a standard limiting distribution. The
test statistic converges to a Chi-squared distribution as the length of time periods
increases to infinity.
The critical values of the test statistic are obtained using bootstrapping. We
consider 1,000 bootstrap iterations. For each iteration, b, we first simulate the game
of the same size as the original and then compute the bootstrap counterpart of the
test statistic Tb. The data generating process used in the simulation is characterized
by the state transition probabilities from the pooled sample.
Note that Otsu, Pesendorfer and Takahashi (2016) propose three statistical tests
comparing the pairs of statistics estimated from the pooled (across markets) sample
with those estimated from each market separately. The statistics concern (1) the set
of conditional choice or state transition probabilities, (2) the steady-state distribu-
tion, and (3) the conditional state distribution given the initial observed state.
In particular, the steady-state distribution test assumes that there exists a unique
steady-state distribution associated with a transition matrix of states. This test is
limited to serve our application for two reasons. First, some of the markets in our
data are new and growing and have not reached the steady state yet. Second, some of
the markets have absorbing states and therefore have no unique steady-state distri-
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bution. The third test relaxes the restriction needed for the steady-state distribution
test but loses statistical power for a small number of markets, that is, less than 40.
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